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'Americans writing about Japan seem to fall into two camps:
those who think the Japanese act according to very different rules
than Americans, so that the apparent similarities between the two
peoples actually mask deep cultural differences;1 and those who
think that the Japanese and the Americans are really rather similar,
so that the obvious cultural differences cover more deep-rooted
continuities.2
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1 The classic cultural account ofJapanese society is R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSAN-
THEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OFJAPANESE CULTURE (1946). See also T. Doi,
THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1973); C. NAKANE,JAPANESE SOCIETY (1970). Recent
accounts by Western observers includeJ. MORLEY, PICTURES FROM THE WATERTRADE
(1985), and P. TAsKER, THE JAPANESE: A MAJOR EXPLORATION OF MODERN JAPAN
(1987). A superb general treatment of modern Japanese history and society is E.
R:EISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE (1977).
2 The leadinglegal scholar who argues for deep-seated similarities betweenjapan
and the United States is J. Mark Ramseyer. See e.g., Ramseyer & Nakazato, The
Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates injapan, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 263,
290 (1989) (arguing that although culture is important, "the current emphasis on
culture in comparative studies ofJapanese law deflects attention from.., mundane
incentive structures"); see also Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitirst
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 604-05
(1985) (explaining the behavior of litigants as it pertains to cultural characteristics);
Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Cheats in Japan,
(forthcomingJ. LEGAL STUD. (Jan. 1991)) (discussing the system of "main banks" in
Japan, andjapanese banks' treatment of troubled borrowers); Ramseyer, Takeoves in
Japan: Opportunisn, Ideology and Corporate Contro, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1987)
(369)
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There may be no authoritative way to resolve this debate, since
what is important in terms of cultural differences lies largely in the
eye of the beholder. Yet it is also possible that detailed investiga-
tion of a specific subject area might yield at least some insights into
the question.
The present study is such a detailed investigation of a particu-
larly intriguing-and economically significant-parallel development
in Japan and the United States. In 1987, regulators in both Japan
and the United States allowed commercial banks to enter the
business of underwriting commercial paper (short-term, unsecured
corporate promissory notes).
That this important development occurred in both countries at
roughly the same time suggests support for the arguments of the
continuity theorists. They believe that the Japanese and American
systems are quite similar in their actual functioning, despite
apparent cultural differences.
At the same time, however, the similarity in the actions taken by
the two governments is matched by an equally striking dissimilarity
in the methods by which those actions were brought about. In the
United States, bank entry into the commercial paper market was
initiated by a private institution, Bankers Trust New York Corpora-
tion. Federal regulators did not design or implement the market-
place changes and were largely cast in the role of reacting to
changes that were already occurring. Some of the major govern-
ment decisions allowing the market to go forward, moreover, were
made by courts of law rather than the regulatory administrative
agencies.
In Japan, by way of contrast, the development of a commercial
paper market with bank involvement was carefully controlled at
every step by a government agency, the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
No private entity took the initiative to move the process forward by
entering the commercial paper business without prior MOF
approval. Moreover, in Japan, litigation was not only absent, but
was never seriously considered as a step towards resolution of the
(discussing the phenomenon of takeovers injapan and considering these implications
as they pertain to the American experience); Ramseyer, WaterLaw in ImperialJapan:
Public Goods, Private Claims, and Legal Convergence 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1989)
(discussing the "similarities between [the Japanese] legal regime and the prior-
appropriation regime in the American West"). Although the theory set forth in the
present study differs in some respects from Ramseyer's general views on the subject,
the authors are greatly in his debt for defining the debate and for many insightful
observations.
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controversy. The views of those interests affected were made known
to the government through an elaborate series of ex parte contacts
at all levels of seniority. This is something that would have been
unthinkable, and probably illegal, at many stages of the proceedings
in the United States. 3 These differences in method lend some
support to proponents of the difference hypothesis, who would
suggest that, despite the apparent similarity of result, the whole
process was radically different due to cultural influences.
Our view, based on an examination of this one limited, albeit
important, development in the commercial life. of Japan and the
United States, is that neither the similarity nor the difference
hypothesis fully explains the evidence under review. In both
countries the question of bank involvement in commercial paper
distribution was a fundamental bone of contention between two
powerful industries, banks and securities firms, because commercial
paper represents a deep threat to the core banking business of
providing short term credit to business enterprises. In each case,
the political battle over commercial paper was fought by powerful
and well-organized special interest groups, and resolved in part by
bureaucratic agencies anxious to preserve their regulatory "turf."4
Although to a casual observer the Japanese events may have
appeared more cordial and less nakedly self-interested than the
American experience, they actually involved an interest-group battle
of ferocious intensity raging within the relatively private confines of
the MOF. The nature of the events in Japan was revealed to us
3 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988),
prohibits communications between any "member of the body comprising the agency,
administrative law judge, or other employee who is or may reasonably be involved"
and anyone involved in the decision-making process or an interested party outside the
agency, if such communications are relevant to the merits of the proceeding. Id.
§ 557(d).
4 A recent and perhaps notorious example of this sort of behavior in the United
States took place when officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission sought
to divest the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission of its jurisdiction over
the regulation of stock-index futures. See, e.g., Egan, Cofingwith Stock-Market Tremors,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 13, 1990, at 66 (noting that "[e]fforts by Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady to give the Securities and Exchange Commission authority
to regulate stock-index futures as well as stocks have bogged down in ajurisdictional
wrangle between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
current overlord"); Hinden, Brady Loses in Fight for Futures Bill; Senate Panels Scuttle
Provision on Control Wash. Post, July 28, 1990, at D10, col. 6 (noting that Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady had "lobbied hard for passage" of legislation that would
have reassignedjurisdiction over the regulation of stock-index futures from the CFTC
to the SEC but had faced "the implacable opposition of the CFTC, the Chicago
futures market and members of Congress with close ties to the agricultural industry").
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through our research which included interviews with many of the
key participants in both government and the private sector and
which focused on the actual mechanics of the Japanese decision.
5
There is no evidence that the Japanese motives were any more noble
or less self-interested than those of the American participants.
At the same time, there are undeniable and important differ-
ences between the Japanese and American approaches to the
conflict. In part, we find that these differences stem from variations
in institutional structure. Because the Japanese MOF has over-
arching responsibility for both securities firms and banks, the
conflict between these industries was channeled inside the walls of
that agency rather than spilling out into the public arena. The latter
was the case in the United States where banks, but not securities
firms, are represented and influential within the relevant agency
(the Federal Reserve Board 6).
In part, the differences also appear to reflect the influence of
factors that could be labeled "cultural." Japanese society-at least
the Japanese commercial society that we studied-is marked by the
extensive use of "preclearance": 7 conflicts are addressed and
resolved in a variety of settings by informal and private means
before any party is forced to take a public stand on an issue. It is
this feature of preclearance that generates the popular clich6 of
5 In researching this Article, we conducted detailed discussions with over 30
individuals in Japan, including high-ranking officials at the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Bank of Japan, important
professors from law faculties, including the University of Tokyo, officials from leading
securities houses and banks, and representatives of the Japan Securities Research
Institute and the Japan Bankers Association. We found all our informants to be both
knowledgeable and extraordinarily forthcoming about the inner workings of the
decision process in Japan. We also interviewed leading securities traders and bank
officials in the United States.
The present study is outside the tradition ofAmerican law review articles in that
it is based largely on the results of detailed interviews with actual participants in the
process. Our goal has been to look behind the formal documentation of decisions
to determine more precisely the actual forces which shaped the outcome. In
addition, as we discuss below, se.? infra text accompanying note 10, our focus is not
simply on the development of legal doctrine, but rather on the complex and subtle
interplay among four great social systems: politics, markets, technology, and law. We
believe that our interviewing technique is a useful supplement to the written record
as a means for bringing into clearer focus the influence of each of these four systems
and the complex interplay among them.
6 We use the term "Federal Reserve Board" interchangeably with other popular
locutions, including Federal Reserve and the Fed.
7 For a fuller discussion on the "preclearance-postclearance" distinction, see infra
text accompanying notes 205-27.
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Japanese society as based on "consensus." The appearance of
consensus does not indicate any lack of conflict within Japanese
society; rather, it reflects the fact that conflicts are typically
addressed and resolved in advance of any overt public confronta-
tion. In contrast, decisions in the United States are often reached
by "postclearance" mechanisms, in which parties are free-indeed,
encouraged-to take public stands that generate confrontation for
the relevant decision-maker's formal, on-the-record resolution. The
history of the commercial paper struggle in the two countries amply
illustrates the difference between preclearance and postclearance
methods of dispute resolution.
It is not at all evident that one method is better than another in
any a priori sense. A naive view might see the Japanese system as
intrinsically better because fewer social resources are devoted to
conflict resolution. This view is notoriously present in Derek Bok's
famous jeremiad on the American legal profession,8 which he
portrays as draining the best talent away from more fruitful
occupations such as business, medicine, or educatioh. Bok suggests
that the United States would benefit by becoming more like the
Japanese, with their minuscule lawyer-to-population ratio and
mighty productive capacities. Yet, aside from the factual shortcom-
ings in Bok's critique,9 it is grossly shortsighted because it fails to
recognize the presence in Japan of a pervasive, and extremely
resource-intensive, system of dispute resolution through pre-
clearance.
An approach more sophisticated than Bok's might attempt to
determine whether the Japanese preference for preclearance and
the American preference for postclearance represent intrinsic
differences between the two cultures, or simply different choices by
the relevant decision-makers. By studying one set of analogous
decisions in the two nations, we can gain insight into the relation-
ship between behavior and culture in the United States and Japan.
In examining the developments in Japan and the United States,
we consider the interplay of four factors: politics, markets,
8 See Bok, A Flawed Systen of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570
(1983).
9 For example, Bok fails to observe that although the ratio ofbengoshi (people who
have passed the bar) to population is much lower than the American lawyer-to-
population ratio, the ratio of law school graduates to population in Japan is much
higher than in the United States. Many of these law graduates go on to careers that
in the United States would require a license to practice law. See Tsubota, Myth and
Truth on Non-Litigiousness in Japan, 30 U. CHI. L. ScH. REC. 8, 9 (1984).
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technology, and law. Rather than viewing the law relating to
commercial paper in isolation from the other three, we see that
each factor profoundly shapes the law. As we demonstrate below,
the evolution of the law in the commercial paper area had an
important political dimension; indeed, in both the United States and
Japan, the legal developments were largely, although not wholly,
driven by the influence of powerful political interest groups.
Technology also influenced the events recounted here: as world
markets have become linked through modern computer and
communications facilities, markets in both the United States and
Japan have increasingly been able to "securitize" assets. 10 The role
of the financial intermediary has accordingly become less crucial to
developed economic systems over the past decade than it was
previously. And market developments such as the growth of money
market mutual funds, the increasing globalization of financial
markets, and the dramatic weakness shown in parts of the American
banking and securities industries over the past few years have all
contributed to'the unfolding of the events recounted in this study.
At the same time, we do not view the legal environment simply
as a passive product of these other systemic developments.
Although changes in the law may be influenced or even caused by
developments in politics, markets, and technology, legal changes
also influence the other systems by altering political alignments,
restructuring markets, and stimulating the development of new
technologies. Thus, the relationships of all four systems are deeply
reciprocal. Economic history is the result of the dynamic interplay
among them.
This politics-markets-technology-law perspective on economic
history is inherently complex in structure. No one variable can be
identified to "explain" any particular development, although lines
of proximate causality often can be traced with some degree of
confidence. All developments depend on the influence of a variety
of different variables, operating within an overall system that is
moving constantly towards equilibrium but, at the same time, is
disturbed repeatedly by new and often unexpected developments.
Thus, the discussion that follows does not identify any single factor
that uniquely explains the developments in Japan or in the United
States. It does identify, at least tentatively, the concatenation of
1o See generally Comment, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Probing the Limits of
National Bank Powers Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 1025 (1987)
(discussing legal limitations on national banks to securitize mortgage assets).
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causes that together influenced these developments, and it offers
some thoughts as to why these particular constellations of forces
may have arisen, and why the mix of factors differed between Japan
and the United States.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I provides a brief
introduction to commercial paper, and to the structure of the
American and Japanese financial services industries. Part II
examines the American experience with bank entry into the
commercial paper market. Part III treats the parallel Japanese
experience. Finally, Part IV ties the two histories together and
draws conclusions about their similarities and differences.
I. BACKGROUND
Commercial paper is one of the various devices which corpora-
tions use to raise funds. It is a short-term, unsecured obligation of
the corporation, issued for a fixed amount and bearing a fixed rate
of interest. Commercial paper occupies a middle ground between
stocks and bonds, on the one hand, and commercial loans on the
other; it is sold in a market like stocks and bonds, rather than being
individually negotiated like commercial loans, but the sales generally
occur by private placement, rather than through public offerings.
For the issuers, commercial paper is an attractive financing
vehicle because it provides ready access to capital markets without
requiring extensive negotiations or creating long-term obligations.
For investors, it is attractive because it pays higher interest than
most bonds or treasury bills, and yet is relatively safe; while the
paper is not backed by any specified assets, its short-term character
means that any major issuer is unlikely to decline to the point of
insolvency during the brief period before the paper matures. In
addition, commercial paper may be backed by a letter of credit from
a bank or other financial institution.
From this description, one might assume that the amount of
commercial paper that a corporation issues, relative to other
financing instruments, is a matter of interest primarily to students
of economics or business administration. In certain European
countries, such as West Germany, where there are virtually no
restrictions on a bank's range of activities, this is in'fact the case.
In the United States and Japan, however, commercial paper has
become a major political, regulatory, and legal issue because of the
separation of financial institutions into banks and securities firms.
In both nations, deposit-taking institutions-that is, banks-have
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been allowed to make commercial loans but have been prohibited
from underwriting securities. This excludes banks from being the
primary manager, or underwriter, of corporate securities issues,
since the underwriter's role is typically to buy the entire issue and
take the risk that some of it cannot be sold at the original price.
Instead, underwriting is performed by investment banks, which are
actually securities firms that buy and sell for their own accounts and
engage in various other transactions. To maintain the separation of
commercial banks and investment banks, the investment banks are
prohibited from accepting deposits.
11
In recent years, there has been a collision between the legal
regime separating commercial banks from securities firms and the
intermediate character of commercial paper. 12 Because commer-
cial paper can readily substitute for commercial loans, banks want
to participate in marketing it. Only the larger, more stable,
corporate borrowers can issue commercial paper, but those are
naturally the customers that banks are most anxious to retain.
Because commercial paper can substitute for corporate securities,
however, the securities firms (investment banks) would like to keep
the banks out of the market. To them, bank participation in
commercial paper transactions represents an incursion into a field
that previously has been their exclusive and highly profitable preserve.
" The prohibition on deposil-taking by investment banks is contained in § 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Glass-Steagall Act and its implications for commercial banks and securities firms, see
H. PITT, J. WILLIAMS, D. MILES & A. AIN, THE EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY (1985).
12 See, e.g., Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The
Dilemma of Glass-Steagal4 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (1984) (noting that "the commercial
paper market is in direct competition with commercial bank loan departments as a
source of credit to top industrial borrowers"); Comment, Securities Activities Under the
Glass-Steagall Ac4 35 EMORY L.J. 463, 463 (1986) (discussing recent conflicts arising
between commercial banks and securities firms).
Most recently, the Federal Reserve Board authorized a commercial bank, J.P.
Morgan, to underwrite equity securities. See Duke & Smith, Fed AllowsJ.P. Moigan to
Underwrite Stocks, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1990, at CI, col. 3. The Fed's favorable
response to the Morgan application represented the first time a bank has been
empowered to engage in such underwriting since 1933. See id. The Fed's move
generated controversy in the investment community. See, e.g., Power & Salwen,
Winners, Losers Take Stock of Glass-Steagall Battle: Securities Industry Has Little Leverage,
Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at CI, col. 3 (noting effort by securities industry to
maintain a competitive advantage in light of the decision of the Federal Reserve);
Sease, Winners, Losers Take Stock of Glass-Steagall Battle: Banks Bask in Equity-
Underwriting Victoy, but New Role May Prove Symbolic for Now, Wall St. J., Sept. 24,
1990, at CI, col. 5 (noting that while the Fed decision is of strategic importance to
banks, it may not represent an immediate threat to the securities industry).
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The conflict between banks and securities firms in the United
States and Japan emerged from a similar legal background, but
developed differently because of dissimilarities in the economic and
regulatory regimes in the two countries. In the United States, the
existence of commercial paper preceded the separation of banking
and securities firms. There has been a commercial paper market in
America since the end of the eighteenth century.13 It evolved
from the use of bearer promissory notes as short-term financing
vehicles; the merchant would write the note, and a dealer would
arrange its sale at a discount to a third party or, more rarely,
purchase the note with an intent to resell it at a higher price. The
incentive for relying on this mechanism was the endemic credit
shortage in many parts of the country, particularly in the South and
the West. Since American banks were limited to operating in one
state at the most, and often to one city or one branch, credit did
not flow readily from one part of the country to another. The sale
of commercial paper was a relatively effective means of establishing
a nation-wide credit market.
The early dealers in commercial paper tended to be private
money brokers or merchant houses who would bring the buyer and
the issuer together for a suitable commission. In the late nine-
teenth century, some of the dealers began to purchase the paper for
their own accounts. A few banks dealt in commercial paper as well,
either as brokers or, more frequently, by purchasing the paper and
then reselling it to other banks with which they had correspondent
relationships. For the most part, however, banks were in the
commercial paper market as buyers rather than dealers.
These practices and, indeed, the entire structure of the
American financial services industry, were transformed by the
legislation following the financial crisis of the Great Depression. In
1933, the Glass-Steagall Act 14 effected the separation of banking
and securities dealing, although it is unclear whether the motivation
for passage of this Act was concern about commercial bank
insolvency or the lobbying efforts of the investment banks.
1 5
13 For the history of the United States commercial paper market, see generally,
N. BAXTER, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET (2d ed. 1966); A. GREEF, THE
COMMERCIAL PAPER HousE IN THE UNITED STATES (1938); Hurley, The Commercial
Paper Marke, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 525 (1977).
14 12 U.S.C. § 24, paras. 7, 78, 377-78 (1988).
15 See Macey, supra note 12, at 15-21 (arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted as the result of interest-group pressures). But see Langevoort, Statutory
Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking
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Section 16 of the Act limits a commercial bank to buying and selling
securities "without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account ... ,16
Section 21 forbids firms which buy and sell for their own account,
or which underwrite securities, from engaging "to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits ... "17 Technically,
the Glass-Steagall Act applies only to banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System, and the wording of its provisions is far
from being air-tight. Nonetheless, the Act was long regarded as
barring commercial banks from dealing in commercial paper,
Whether by acting as brokers (placing the paper with buyers) or, as
underwriters (purchasing for their own account with an intent to
resell). This view was so well accepted that banks did not attempt
to deal in commercial paper for nearly fifty years.
The banks' hands-off attitude towards commercial paper
undoubtedly reflected the stability and profitability of commercial
banking during the posi-Depression period. With a rapidly-
expanding economy generating increasing demands for commercial
loans, banks had little economic incentive to enter the commercial
paper market. That market, moreover, had declined precipitously
even before the Depression; between 1920 and 1933 the amount of
commercial paper outstanding fell from one billion to one hundred
and thirty-nine million dollars.' 8 Many dealers left the market or
merged, with the result that market concentration increased rapidly.
By 1938, nine major dealers controlled ninety percent of the
market. These conditions continued through the 1960s, and kept
the commercial paper market from seeming like either a threat or
an opportunity to commercial banks.' 9
In the late 1960s, however, large corporations began to rely
increasingly on commercial paper to fund their short term financing
needs. The spreads and placement costs on commercial paper fell
low enough that a corporation could often save money by going
directly into the commercial paper market rather than by obtaining
funds from a bank or another financial intermediary.2 ° In addi-
Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 716-17 (1987) (arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act
was intended "as much as anything.., to redirect the resources and energies of the
banking industry back to the historic role as provider of commercial credit").
16 12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988).
17 Id. § 378(a)(1).
18 See Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 362, 362 n.2 (1972) (citing N. BAXTER, supra note 13, at 17).
19 See id. at 365-66.
20 From 1964 to June 1971, the savings differential on commercial paper as
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tion, many corporations relying on bank loans for financing were
effectively forced to issue commercial paper in 1966 when bank
credit temporarily dried up as a result of high nominal interest
rates.2 1 Once having entered the commercial paper market, many
firms were reluctant to return to higher-cost bank financing even
when bank funds became readily available again. 22 Commercial
paper outstanding grew fivefold, from $10.1 billion in 1966 to $52.6
billion in 1976.23 Banks, to their surprise and dismay, began to
see commercial paper as a threatening competitor for their core
loan business.
24
The problem was not simply a-loss of loan revenues, although
this was bad enough. In addition, commercial banks were deprived
of key information about the activities of their loan customers. In
the days when corporations returned to their banks frequently to
roll over commercial loans, banks were able to maintain regular
contact with their customers and thus to obtain reliable, current
information about them. That source of information began to dry
up as blue chip corporations increasingly turned to the commercial
paper market for their short-term financing needs. Faced with these
circumstances, banks began to reevaluate the long-accepted notion
that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited them from dealing in
commercial paper.
In Japan, the separation of banking and securities firms
preceded the development of commercial paper as a mechanism for
corporate finance. The separation was effected by article 65 of the
Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 (SEL)25 which was imposed
on Japan during the American occupation. SEL prohibits banks,
inter alia, from underwriting securities, engaging in the public
offering of outstanding securities, and handling the public offering
of new or outstanding securities. 26 This law represented a depar-
ture from the pre-war organization of the Japanese financial services
industry. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868,27 Japan had
compared with the bank prime rate was approximately .93%. See id. at 365 n.10.
21 See Hurley, supra note 13, at 531-32.
22 See id. at 532.
23 See id. at 525.
24 See id. at 525 (noting that "[flor the firms that issue it, commercial paper is an
important substitute for bank credit"); Interview with Thomas A. Parisi, Senior Vice
President, Bankers Trust Company (Apr. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Parisi interview].
25 Law No. 25 of 1948.
26 See id. at art. 65, para. 1.
27 The Meiji Restoration, alongwith infusion of Chinese culture and the establish-
ment of the Shogunate, was one of the great turning points injapanese history. The
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developed a universal banking system organized along European
lines. Securities underwriting was dominated by government banks,
such as the Industrial Bank ofJapan, and banks that were members
of the great industrial groups, or zaibatsu, such as Mitsui Bank.
Securities firms existed, but acted only as brokers and distributors
of issues to the general public. The imposition of article 65 was a
product of the interesting American belief that a democratic regime
not only required free elections, free speech, and due process, but
also antitrust laws and the Glass-Steagall Act.28
From the Japanese perspective, article 65 "fulfills no domestic
policy purpose and exists only by virtue of historical accident."
29
As one might expect, engrafting this provision upon an already well-
developed financial services industry led to different results fromri
those that its original produced in the United States. Most notably,
the old zaibatsu have managed to knit together business alliances,
called keiretsu, and retain many of their pre-war relationships on an
informal basis. These relationships are cemented by a practice of
cross-shareholding, where each member company owns up to 5% of
the equity in the other companies. Banks participate in this
practice, just as they participated in the erstwhile zaibatsu system.
Gross-shareholding is permissible under article 65 which states that
banks may purchase securities for their "own investment pur-
pose[s]." 30 While the United States Comptroller of the Currency
construed the analogous Glass-Steagall language to permit only the
purchase of marketable debt instruments, not stock, article 65 has
been construed as permitting stock purchases. Moreover, Japanese
banks, unlike American banks, are not forbidden from affiliating
with securities firms. Thus, a securities firm can become a member
of a keiretsu that includes a bank. All of the major Japanese banks
Meiji Restoration marked the downfall of the Shogun and the beginning of a modern
state in Japan, under the guise ofrestoring the Emperor to his throne. For a general
discussion, see, e.g., J.W. HALL, JAPAN FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 265-72
(1970) (discussing political and cultural effects of the Meiji Restoration); P. TASKER,
supra note 1, at 20-23 (describing Western influence on Japan during the Meiji
Restoration); and M. YOSHINO, JAPAN's MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3-6 (1976)
(explaining the causes and describing the effects of the Meiji Restoration).
28 For a discussion of American sponsored reforms in the Japanese financial
sector, see F. ROSENBLUTH, FINANCIAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 39-41
(1989). For a general discussion of legal reforms effected during the American
occupation ofJapan, see E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 105-09.
2 Dale,Japan's "Glass-Steagall Ac4"2J. INT'L BANKING L. 138-41 (1987).
30 Law No. 25 of 1948.
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have become informally affiliated with one or more securities
firms.3
1
As a matter of practice, it appears that Japanese banks can in
fact participate in underwritingJapanese corporate debt despite the
SEL's specific prohibitions. They do so by acting as "commissioned
underwriting companies," which means they serve as advisor, agent,
and trustee for the issuing corporation. Banks also assume the
default risk in case the issuing company becomes insolvent. This
practice is done not as a legal obligation, since article 65, like the
Glass-Steagall Act, forbids doing so, but as a moral one, legally
unenforceable but well-recognized and well-accepted. 2 American
banks do not assume such moral obligations. Even if they were to
declare that they would assume such obligations, securities buyers
would not believe them. The inability of United States banks to
declare ex ante that they will guarantee corporate debt means that
they cannot compete with investment banks that are permitted to
engage in firm commitment underwriting. Since Japanese banks
can credibly commit themselves to assume the risks of the debt
securities they place, they are able to play a significant role in
underwriting c6rporate debt.
Despite these differences and the more lenient interpretation
Japanese authorities have given their imported article 65, this
provision is not without effect in Japan. The separation of the
banking and securities businesses has led to the evolution of
independent securities firms with their own corporate identity,
markets to defend, and network of political influence. The four
largest firms have evolved into powerful financial institutions. One
of these, Nomura Securities, can reasonably be regarded as the most
formidable (and profitable) company in the Japanese financial
services industry.3 3 Thus, when the conflict over commercial
paper arose,Japanese banks, despite the porous nature of article 65
restrictions, found themselves facing a worthy set of adversaries.
S1 See Dale, supra note 29, at 139 (noting the commonality of the practice); A
Survey ofJapanese Finance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988, at 13-14.32 See Nagao, The Bond Marke repinted in E. SAKAKIBARA & Y. NAGAO, STUDY ON
THE TOKYO CAPITAL MARKETS 63-64 (1985) (remarking that "in the case of an actual
default ... it is the commissioned bank which has protected the investor by
purchasing such outstanding bonds at par value").
3 See, e.g., A. ALLETZHAUSER, THE HOUSE OF NOMURA xi (1990) (stating that
"Nomura has more assets under custody than ... the world's largest bank; makes
more money than any financial firm in the world; controls 20% of the Japanese bond
market; and dominates the Eurobond underwriting tables").
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This conflict did not emerge until the late 1970s for the simple
reason that there was no commercial paper in Japan. The only
short-term financial markets in existence prior to that time were the
call market, the bill discount market established by the Bank of
Japan in 1971 in which financial institutions trade discounted
promissory notes issued by corporations, and the gensaki market, a
market for bonds with repurchase agreements that gained promi-
nence and official recognition in the 1970s. The call market is
limited to financial intermediaries, while the bill discount market is
further restricted to commercial banks and money brokers.
Moreover, until very recently, the market for short-term Japanese
government debt has been insignificant. 34
Only the gensaki market was open to sizeable investment by non-
financial corporations. As a market for bonds with repurchase
agreements, however, it does not provide most corporations with a
method for borrowing short-term funds. Only a corporation that
holds a large portfolio of long-term bonds can raise short-term
funds by gensaki transactions, selling bonds with repurchase
agreements. Because of the lack of a commercial paper or similar
market, Japanese industry essentially lacked any alternative to short-
term financing from banks.
Bank borrowing was, and to a lesser extent continues to be, the
dominant method of raising both short and long-term capital for
industry. Banking itself is divided into several distinct markets.
Commercial banks are restricted to the market for deposits of three
years or less duration. Smaller commercial banks, the regional and
mutual banks, generally have a net excess of funds deposited
through extensive branch networks. They supply some of these
excess funds to the twelve large commercial banks called the City
Banks. The City Banks dominate short-term finance to large
corporations by serving as the "main banks" of these corporations.
Several City Banks form the nuclei of the keiretsu. They tended to
be "overloaned" throughout the high-growth era, borrowing from
the smaller banks through the interbank call and bill discount
markets and from the Bank of Japan's discount window.35
34 See Opening the Door to Japan's Short-Tern Money Markets, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1,
1989, at 65 (noting thatJapan's treasury bill market is only one twenty-fourth the size
of the United States' treasury bill market).
35 See Wallich & Wallich, Banking and Finance, in ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 249, 284-90 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky eds. 1976); see also
Y. SUZUKI, MONEY AND BANKING IN CONTEMPORARYJAPAN 3-13 (1980) (explaining the
concept of "overloan" and noting that in the early 1970s Japan was the only major
HeinOnline -- 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 382 1990-1991
1990] COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDERWRITING BYBANKS 383
The seven trust banks and three long-term credit banks are
restricted to the longer-term market segments. Both groups are
permitted to raise medium- and long-term funds in order to provide
longer-term capital for industrial development.
While deregulation has begun to blur distinctions between trust
banks, long-term credit banks, and commercial banks, the City
Banks still dominate short-term finance for large Japanese corpora-
tions. Smaller commercial banks, trust banks, and long-term credit
banks therefore did not have much direct interest in the commercial
paper debate. In the controversy described below, the City Banks
did most of the lobbying and negotiating.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
A. The Bankers Trust Initiative in Placing Commercial Paper
In 1978, Bankers Trust Company, a state-chartered member
bank of the Federal Reserve System, challenged the prevailing view
that the Glass-Steagall Act barred banks from any substantial role in
the distribution of commercial' paper. Bankers Trust did so by
acting as agent for several large corporate customers that wanted to
place commercial paper with investors.3 6 The company's decision
to enter the market was apparently defensive: Bankers Trust was
not seeking to poach on the turf of securities firms, but rather to
protect its core loan business and customer relations against
competition from securities firms.
3 7
It is not clear why Bankers Trust adopted a "go it alone"
strategy. To be sure, as a major city bank serving the credit needs
of large corporations, Bankers Trust had much to lose from
commercial paper competition. But so did other big banks, such as
Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover. There
were significant free rider effects in this situation. By acting
unilaterally, Bankers Trust benefitted not only itself, but also its
rival banks which stood to profit from a ruling allowing bank
involvement in the commercial paper market. Furthermore, it
country in which the central bank was a net lender).
36 Banks previously had purchased commercial paper for their own accounts and
had acted for customers in purchasing paper, but had not represented issuers in
distributing it. See Policy Statement Concerning the Sale of Third Party Commercial
Paper by State Member Banks, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,333, 29,334 n.4 (1981).
7 See Horowitz, Bankers Trust Moves Ahead in Commercial Paper, Suit by Sui AM.
BANKER, Sept. 23, 1987, at 16, 24.
HeinOnline -- 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 383 1990-1991
384 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:369
might well have been cheaper and safer for Bankers Trust to seek
prior Federal Reserve Board approval for its commercial paper
activities. Bankers Trust would probably have received the support
of other big commercial banks in any proceeding before the Federal
Reserve, or before the courts on petition for review of the Board's
decision.
Bankers Trust's decision to follow the arguably riskier course of
unilateral action was apparently designed to gain a number of
advantages. First, the decision-makers at Bankers Trust no doubt
understood that a dealer must work in volume to survive in the
commercial paper business.38  Accordingly, Bankers Trust may
have hoped to get ajump on other commercial banks as a dealer in
commercial paper. If so, its strategy succeeded: even today it is the
leading bank in the market, although its market share falls short of
the leading securities firms.3 9 Second, Bankers Trust believed that
gaining a toehold in the market, while not necessarily profitable in
itself, would allow it to establish lines of communication with
corporate customers that would place it in an advantageous position
for selling other, more profitable, bank services. 40 Third, Bankers
Trust had decided in 1978 to focus on wholesale as opposed to
retail banking, and to develop an in-house investment banking
capability. 4 1  Entry into the commercial paper market was an
important step in this direction. Finally, Bankers Trust may have
38 As of December 1988, Bankers Trust handled approximately $11 billion in
commercial paper outstanding (i.e., unmatured paper placed by a company at any
given time), representing less than 5% of the market. Although it was the sixth
largest player in the market, as measured by the amount outstanding, its market share
was far below those of the four leading securities firms: Merrill Lynch ($70 billion
outstanding), Goldman Sachs ($60 billion), Shearson Lehman Hutton ($55 billion)
and First Boston Corp. ($30 billion). See Neustadt, Big Banks Make Gains Placing
Coiporate Paper, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1988, at 1, 14.
It is not at all clear that even with programs totaling $11 billion Bankers Trust was
able to make a profit. Trading professionals we interviewed believe that the break
even point for commercial paper placement is approximately $25-30 billion, as
evidenced by the fact that Salomon Brothers dropped out of the commercial paper
market with approximately $28 billion of commercial paper outstanding. See
Interview with Richard Fuscone & T. James Smithwick of Merrill Lynch Money
Markets Inc. (Apr. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Fuscone & Smithwick interview].
39 See Neustadt, supra note 38, at 14.
40 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
41 See id. Traders we interviewed at other firms indicated that Bankers Trust was
known in the market as having a "good trading desk" and a "trading mentality or
mindset," stemming partly from rhe influence of its Chairman, who was widely known
as an innovative force within the banking industry.
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intended to establish a reputation as a dynamic innovator in the
financial services industry.
42
In all likelihood, Bankers Trust consulted informally with
Federal Reserve Board officials before actually entering the
commercial paper market.43 No law prevented this type of
informal consultation, and the bank could only gain from it, given
the virtual certainty of a legal challenge from the securities industry
which would draw the Board into the decision sooner or later. We
do not know whether or not Bankers Trust received any informal
assurances from Board officials. We are confident, however, that
Bankers Trust would not have proceeded unilaterally if it suspected
that the Board would disapprove, given the Board's enormous
discretionary powers over banking institutions and its reputation for
punishing banks which provoke it.4
4
The securities industry quickly sought to quash the Bankers
Trust commercial paper program. The Securities Industry Associa-
tion (SIA), a national trade association of securities firms, ap-
proached the Board on an informal basis to complain of the
activity.45  When the Board declined to act, the SIA-acting on
42 A Bankers Trust officer we interviewed denied this motivation, however. See
id.
41 See id. We learned that the legal department of Bankers Trust engaged in
extensive communications with the regulators, and probably advised them of the
planned entry into commercial paper. It should be noted that these informal
consultations represent a form of "preclearance" which, as we argue throughout this
paper, is more characteristic ofJapanese than American decision-making. However,
Bankers Trust knew that the Board was its ally on this issue; thus the prior
consultation was not a form of conflict resolution of the sort that occurs so widely in
Japan. Moreover, our argument is not that preclearance is absent in the United
States-or postclearance in Japan-but rather that the United States andJapan differ
dramatically in the degree to which the two methods are used.
44 A revealing glimpse into the powers of the Board is provided in a story well-
known in the banking community. The episode involved the Board's treatment of
NewJersey's Horizon Bank in 1985 after that institution had won approval from the
Comptroller of the Currency to relocate a branch across state -lines. Interstate
branching of any sort threatens the Board's regulatory jurisdiction, which operates
principally at the holding company level. See e.g., Miller, Interstate Branching and the
Constitution, 41 Bus. LAW. 337, 338 (1986) (examining "the constitutionality of state
laws that prohibit entry by branches of out-of-state banks"). The Board reportedly
responded to Horizon's action by threatening to refuse check-clearingservices to the
bank, a move which would have devastated the bank's operations. Not surprisingly,
Horizon dropped the idea of an interstate branch. See Rehm, Bradfield Bids Reluctant
Adieu to the Fed, AM. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1989, at 1. Although the Board official
involved in that matter has departed from the scene, the object lesson about the
Board's powers remains cogent.
45 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 468 U.S.
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behalf of the securities iridustry-formally petitioned for a ruling
that the Bankers Trust activities violated sections 16 and 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act.4 6 The Board denied the petition in 1980.
47
Applying a functional analysis, the Board determined that commer-
cial paper was not a "security" subject to the Act since its economic
role is more akin to a standard commercial bank loan than to a
corporate security. The Board did recognize, however, that the
Bankers Trust activities posed potential hazards, and accordingly
issued a "policy statement" restricting the terms under which
member banks could enter the market.
4 8
The consequence of the Board's decisions was to create a system
of administrative control virtually unfettered by statutory standards.
By first declaring that commercial paper is not a security and then
imposing a relatively elaborate set of discretionary administrative
constraints on bank involvement in commercial paper sales, the
Board maximized its own administrative control of the situation and
retained the flexibility to ease those constraints as the market
evolved. In contrast, if the Board had declared commercial paper
to be a "security" it would have had no choice but to invalidate
137, 140 (1984) [hereinafter Bankers Trust I].
46 Section 16 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that
[t]he business of dealingin securities and stock by [a commercial bank] shall
be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988). Section 21(a)(1) makes it unlawful for
any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar
organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation,
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same
time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to
check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of
deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor.
Id. § 378(a)(1).
47 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 141.
48 The most important restrictions were the following: member banks were
limited to selling "prime quality' paper to "financially sophisticated" investors; they
were not permitted to advertise to the general public; they could not sell paper with
denominations below $100,000; they were required to use due diligence in
investigating the financial affairs. of the issuer; and they were prohibited from selling
commercial paper to fiduciary accounts over which they exercised investment
discretion. See Policy Statement Concerning the Sale of Third Party Commercial
Paper by State Member Banks, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,333, 29,334-35 (1981).
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actions by member banks- which constituted underwriting of
commercial paper.
The SIA petitioned for review of the Board's order declaring
commercial paper to be outside the scope of the term "security" in
the Glass-Steagall Act. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court, which in 1984 reversed the Board and held commercial
paper to be a "security" for purposes of the Act.49 The Boards
interpretation was flawed, according to the Court, because exclud-
ing commercial paper from the definition of a security under the
Glass-Steagall Act would threaten some of the "subtle hazards"
which, in the Court's view, Congress had feared when it enacted the
statute. For example, the Court suggested that a bank's "salesman's
interest" in a commercial paper issue might lead it to enhance the
marketability of the paper by extending backup credit to the
issuer.50 In addition, the bank might purchase unsold paper which
it was distributing, in order to establish its reputation as a reliable
dealer, even if the paper did not meei ordinary credit standards,51
or market commercial paper issues to its depositors, with the
attendant danger of loss of confidence in the bank if the issuer were
to default. 52 Finally, a bank's interest might cause it to slant its
investment advice to depositors, especially if the proceeds of the
commercial paper issuance were to go towards retiring an existing
loan with the bank.53
The Supreme Court's decision was unusual in that the Court
refused to defer to the views of an expert administrative agency on
a subject within the agency's administrative competence. 54  It is
probable that the Justices in the majority saw two chief problems
with the Board's actions that warranted a departure from the usual
rule of deference.
First, the Board had admitted that bank sales of commercial
paper posed hazards. This was the basis for its order limiting the
49 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
50 See id. at 155.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 155-56.
53 See id. at 156.
54 The Court's failure to defer to the Board's intrpretation was the basis for
Justice O'Connor's lengthy dissent; joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. See
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 160-82 (1984); cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (stating that deference
should be given to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it
administers, and applying this deference to the Environmental Protection Agency's
definition of a term in the Clean Air Act).
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terms on which such sales could proceed. Since the Board had
conceded that there were hazards, and since those hazards seemed
similar, or identical, to the hazards that motivated Congress to enact
the Glass-Steagall Act, it appeared incongruous that the Board
should reject the applicability of the Act and then seek to control
the hazards by fiat pursuant to its generalized authority to protect
the safety and soundness of member banks. This seemed like a
thinly disguised end run around the statute. The Board's orders
thus "effectively convert[ed] a portion of the Act's broad prohibition
into a system of administrative regulation." 55
The Court's second principal objection was that the banking
industry itself had apparently accepted its exclusion from commer-
cial paper dealings without protest for nearly fifty years. As the
Court observed, "it is certainly not without some significance that
Bankers Trust's commercial-paper placement activities appear to be
the first of that kind since the passage of the [Glass-Steagall]
Act."56 The Court observed that banks had "universally recog-
nized" that underwriting commercial paper fell on the investment
banking side of the Glass-Steagall divide.57
Accordingly, the Supreme Court's role at this stage of the
controversy appears to have been a conservative one: preserving the
status quo under which banks did not deal in commercial paper,
championing a perceived congressional intent, and resisting
administrative tinkering with the statute for contemporary policy
purposes.
The securities industry's apparent victory in the Bankers Trust I
case did not end the dispute, however. At the end of its opinion,
the Court dropped a suggestive footnote, observing that it was not
deciding whether the activities undertaken by Bankers Trust
constituted the "underwriting" of securities. This was important.
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited only commercial
bank involvement in the "underwriting" of securities. 58 Securities
brokerage, as opposed to underwriting, appeared to be expressly
allowed by the Act, which recognized the power of commercial
banks to purchase and sell securities "without recourse, solely upon
the order, and for the account of, customers." 59 Section 21 of the
55 Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at. 153.
56 Id. at 159-60.
57 See id. at 160.
58 See id. at 160 n.12.
-9 See 12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1988).
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Act only prohibited firms engaged in "the business" of underwriting
or distributing securities from acting as depository institutions.
60
Bankers Trust's commercial paper operations would not violate the
Glass-Steagall Act if they did not constitute "underwriting" or
"distributing" commercial paper. Thus the Supreme Court's 1984
decision merely represented a battle won by the securities industry,
but did not resolve the war.
On remand, the Board decided that the Bankers Trust place-
ment of commercial paper constituted the selling of securities
without recourse and solely on the order and for the account of a
customer, a practice permitted by sections 16 and 21 of the Act.61
The decision went on to conclude that Bankers Trust was not
"underwriting" securities because the term "underwriting" in the
Act referred only to public offers, not to private placements of the
sort undertaken by Bankers Trust. A federal district court re-
versed,6 2 but the D.C. Circuit reinstated the Board's decision. It
concluded that the Board's interpretation of the statute was entitled
to deference and that the Bankers Trust program did not pose the
sort of subtle hazards that the Supreme Court had considered in its
earlier decision (Bankers Trust 1).63 Bankers Trust, accordingly,
was free to proceed with its commercial paper placement program.
B. The Bankers Trust Initiative in Underwriting
Commercial Paper
So far, Bankers Trust and, by implication, other member banks
had gained only the power to act as agents in the placement of
commercial paper. Underwriting would clearly be prohibited if
performed by the banks. This meant that as a practical matter
Bankers Trust could not purchase for its own account commercial
paper which it was placing with other investors. According to
Bankers Trust officials we interviewed, this limitation placed
Bankers Trust at a competitive disadvantage relative to securities
firms which were free from similar constraints; 64 Bankers Trust
60 See id. § 378(a)(1).
61 The unpublished opinion is described in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1005 (1987) [hereinafter Bankers Trust II].62 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 627 F. Supp.
695 (D.D.C. 1986), revd, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
63 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1067-70.
64 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
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would be required to sell all of its customers' paper on the day of
issue; if any were left over at the close of the day Bankers Trust
could not purchase it. Bankers Trust proposed to the Board that it
be allowed to make up any shortfall with a loan to the issuer at the
commercial paper rate, but the Board refused.65 Thus, Banker's
Trust had gained a toehold, but not yet a position of competitive
equality with securities firms: it could not underwrite commercial
paper, nor could it make up shortfalls at the close of the day.
Bankers Trust and other large money center banks responded
to this limitation in two ways. First, sometime in 1985, they
developed a new financial product, the short-term securitized loan,
as a partial substitute for commercial paper.6 6  A bank would
originate a loan with a maturity and interest rate similar to that of
commercial paper, and then sell interests in the loan to other
institutions. The effect is functionally similar to a commercial paper
placement, but because the transaction is structured as a loan
instead of a distribution of securities, the Glass-Steagall Act does
not constrain the originating bank from taking an interest in the
loan-i.e., from acting in a irole functionally equivalent to underwrit-
ing.
Second, Bankers Trust applied to the Board of Governors for
permission under the Bank Holding Company Act 6 7 to transfer its
commercial paper activities to a second-tier subsidiary of the parent
bank holding company. The Chicago-based subsidiary, BT Commer-
cial Corporation, was engaged in making and servicing loans and in
commercial leasing, activities previously declared by the Board to be
permissible for nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies
under the Bank Holding Company Act.68 Bankers Trust's motive
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1988), permits bank holding companies to maintain nonbank
subsidiaries, provided that the subsidiary's activities are "so closely related to banking
or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto .... " Federal
Reserve Board approval is required before a nonbank subsidiary may enter into any
new line of business. At the time of the Bankers Trust application, the Federal
Reserve Board had exempted a number of nonbanking activities either by order or
in its Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1990), but it had never addressed the question
of whether commercial paper placement was permissible for a nonbank subsidiary.
68 See Fidelity American Bankshares, Inc., Fed. Res. Bd. Order, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 95,832, at 80,761-2 (Dec. 14, 1972)
(holding that providing and servicing loans is "closely related to the business of
banking" and, therefore, permissible for bank holding companies); Leasing Computer
Equipment and Lease Financing, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
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in moving the commercial paper business over to its holding
company did not arise out of a concern for short-term profit; in all
probability, commercial paper placement per se could not be
performed more efficiently out of a commercial finance subsidiary
than out of the bank itself. Moreover, there was no obvious
advantage (and perhaps some disadvantage) to running the
commercial paper operation out of Chicago instead of New York.
Although placing the operation in a nonbank bank holding company
subsidiary offered the potential for geographic diversification free
of restrictions under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act,69 there is no indication in the record that Bankers
Trust intended to expand its commercial paper placement opera-
tions outside of Chicago. The most likely explanation is that the
application was a strategic move designed as part of a long-range
plan to position Bankers Trust as a leading commercial bank
presence in the investment banking field, and, in particular, to allow
eventual securities underwriting.
Bankers Trust had every reason to expect a favorable response
to its application. The Board itself, and most importantly its
powerful Chairman, Paul A. Volcker, had gone on record as
supporting enhanced securities powers for bank holding companies,
including the power to deal in commercial paper;70 and the
Bankers Trust application provided the Board with a convenient
(CCH) 95,716 (June 29, 1972) (noting that transactions where a lease is the
functional equivalent of an extension of credit to the lessee are permissible for bank
holding companies).
169The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1988), permits bank holding companies to own subsidiary banks outside
their home state only if the state where the subsidiary is located has enacted
legislation permitting the acquisition. See also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 168-73 (1985) (interpreting the
Douglas amendment).
7 See, e.g., Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies (Part
I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affair of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1986) (statement of
Paul A. Volcker), reprinted in 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 541,549 (1986) (noting that the Board
has long supported an approach that would' permit subsidiaries of bank holding
companies to engage in underwriting and distributing commercial paper); Financial
Restructuring: The Road Ahead: Hearings on H.R. 5342, H.R. 4506 and H.R. 3537
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 144, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
(statement of Paul A. Volcker), reprinted in 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 312, 316 (1984) (noting
the need to reexamine the limitations of banking organizations in light of the market
changes, changes in technology, consumer needs, and the regulatory and economic
environment).
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means for accomplishing this policy objective. 71 Indeed, Bankers
Trust probably had received informal prior assurances from Board
staff that its application would not be unwelcome. 72 We were
informed by a Bankers Trust official that the bank frequently
consulted with the Board on a friendly and informal basis on the
commercial paper question.
73
The Bankers Trust application implicated section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act,74 which prohibits affiliations between member
banks and organizations "engaged principally" in the securities
business.75 The Board held that actions permitted to a bank itself
under sections 16 and 21 should not be denied to a bank affiliate
under section 20.76 Thus, because the Board had previously
approved commercial paper placement activities by the bank itself,
and that approval had been upheld by the D.C. Circuit,77 the
activity was permissible a fortiori for nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies.
The Board could have ended its analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act
at this point, but it went on to provide an alternative basis for
decision: even if the activities in question did constitute "underwrit-
ing" under section 20, they would not violate the Glass-Steagall Act
because the securities subsidiary would not be "engaged principally"
in such activity. 78 The Board held that the term "engaged princi-
71The Board could, in theory, have proceeded by informal rulemaking, amending
Regulation Y to include acting as agent in the sale of commercial paper as part of the
Regulation Y "laundry list" of activities generally permitted to nonbank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies. However, the Board has traditionally added activities to
Regulation Y only after determining by order in one or more concrete cases that the
activity in question was permissible. Thus an initial rulemaking approach would have
been out of the ordinary course and would have received attention in Congress and
elsewhere. The Board may not have wanted to dramatize its action in this fashion.
72 See supra note 34.
73 See Interview with James Beckley (Apr. 11, 1989).
74 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
75 Section 20 provides, in pertinent part, that "no member bank shall be affiliated
... with any... organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation
of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities . . . ." See id. Congress
extended this provision to insured nonmember banks in the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub L. No. 100-86, § 103, 101 Stat. 552, 566-67 (1987).76 See Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138,139-40 (1987)
(citing Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
60 n.26 (1981)).77 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
78 See Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 145-46.
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pally" meant "any substantial line of business activity."79  It
concluded that the subsidiary would not be engaged principally in
the securities business if its gross revenues from commercial paper
activities constituted less than five percent of its total gross revenues
and the company's total commercial paper outstanding represented
less than five percent of the average amount of all dealer-placed
commercial paper outstanding.80
The Board then examined the legal issues arising under the
Bank Holding Company Act.81 It held, first, that the proposed
activities would be "closely related to banking" because commercial
paper placement is similar to the traditional banking function of
arranging loan participations with other banks and other institu-
tional lenders.8 2 It then held that the proposed activity represent-
ed a "proper incident" to banking because the public benefits of the
activity (increased competition and greater customer convenience)
outweighed the potential adverse effects (such as unfair competi-
tion, insider trading, and under concentration of resources).83
The Board therefore approved the application, subject to several
constraints proposed by Bankers Trust itself.84
The Board's decision to allow a bank holding company subsid-
iary to place commercial paper left open the question of whether it
would be permissible for such a subsidiary to underwrite commercial
paper-that is, to purchase such paper for its own account for resale
to customers at a profit. That question came to the Board a few
months later in the form of an application by The Chase Manhattan
Corporation to underwrite and deal in third party commercial paper
to a limited extent through a commercial finance subsidiary. The
Board, relying on its earlier Bankers Trust decision, held that the
71 Id. at 142.
80 See id. at 146.
81 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
82 Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull, at 147.
8s See id. at 152.
84 Among other limitations, the Board ruled that the subsidiary could place only
prime quality short-term paper in minimum denominations of $250,000; could place
the paper only with sophisticated financial institutions; could not inventory unsold
portions of the paper it placed, nor purchase such paper for its own account; could
not earn revenues from commercial paper placement exceeding five percent of gross
revenues in any given year; could not achieve a market share exceeding five percent
of all dealer-placed paper at any one time; could not back the paper with which it
dealt by letters of credit or guarantees; could not extend credit to issuers to cover
unsold paper; could not provide investment advice to purchasers; and could not have
officers, directors, or employees in common with any of the holding company's
subsidiary banks. See id. at 152-53.
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Chase subsidiary would not be "engaged principally" in the
securities business, even though it would be underwriting rather
than acting as agent, so long as it adhered to the five percent
revenue limitation. s5 Relying on the Bankers Trust decision, it
held further that the proposed commercial paper underwriting was
a permissible activity for nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies under the Bank Holding Company Act, provided that the
Chase subsidiary adhered to the limitations on operations imposed
by the Board in the Bankers Trust New York Corporation case.8
6
C. Further Breaches in the Glass-Steagall Barrier
The logic of these decisions was not limited to commercial
paper. If a nonbank subsidiary could sell commercial paper as
agent or underwriter, there was no apparent reason under the
language of the Glass-Steagall Act why such an organization could
not broker or sell all forms of securities, provided that the activity
in question was not so substantial as to run afoul of the proscription
in section 20 against "engag[ing] principally" in the securities
business. 87  Although commercial paper marked the entering
wedge into the securities business, it was clear that applications for
other securities activities would not be far behind.
Indeed, at the time it decided the Bankers Trust New York
Corporation and the Chase Manhattan Corporation cases, the Board
had pending before it just such an application.88 Three bank
holding companies-Citicorp,J.P. Morgan & Co., and Bankers Trust
New York Corporation-sought approval for nonbank subsidiaries
to underwrite municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-related securities,
consumer-receivable-related securities, and commercial paper. The
subsidiaries designated to engage in these activities were then
engaged in underwriting securities such as U.S. government and
agency and state and municipal securities ("bank-eligible" securities)
that member banks are permitted to underwrite under section 16 of
the Glass-Steagall Act.8
9
85 See Chase Manhattan Cori)., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367, 368 (1987).
86 See id. at 371. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board's decision in Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988).87 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
88 See Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 371.
89 See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 473
(1987).
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The Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust cases represented
two further steps by commercial banks into the securities business.
First, aside from commercial paper underwriting, which the Board
had approved as closely related to banking in the Chase Manhattan
Corporation case, 90 the securities involved in the later applications
were relatively far-removed from the traditional banking business.
It was unclear whether underwriting these securities would pass
muster under the Bank Holding Company-Act. Second, because the
subsidiary companies in question were involved in underwriting
government securities, there was a close question as to whether the
existing business of these firms would be considered the "securities"
business for purposes of section 20. If so, then the petitions would
have to be denied because the subsidiary would be principally
engaged (indeed, wholly engaged) in the securities business in
violation of section 20. If, on the other hand, bank-eligible activities
were excluded from the securities business to which section 20
applies, then the petitions might well be upheld because the bank-
ineligible portion of the business might be considered insubstantial
in comparison with the total volume of business conducted by the
firm.
The applications thus raised important issues for the future of
the financial services industry. The three bank holding companies
sought, in essence, to be allowed to operate large-scale investment
banking affiliates engaged in underwriting a wide variety of
securities. Even the stringent five percent revenue test imposed by
the Board in prior cases would not restrict seriously the operation
of these proposed section 20 affiliates, at least not in the short run,
because as primary dealers in government securities the firms
brought in such an enormous amount of revenue that there were
few practical impediments to conducting a full-scale underwriting
business. In short, while approval of these applications did not
quite have the potential of eviscerating the Glass-Steagall Act, it did
create the possibility of allowing the kind of bank involvement in
the securities business that the Act had long been thought to
prohibit.
The Board approved the applications by a split decision, with
Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell dissenting.9 1 The majori-
ty rejected the contention that bank-eligible securities such as U.S.
go See Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 368.
9' See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 505-06.
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government obligations fell within the term "securities" in section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, observing that such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the evident congressional intent to
impose less burdensome restrictions on securities activities by
affiliates than on activities by banks themselves.9 2 The Board then
applied its five percent gross revenue and market share limitations
to the proposals in determining that the proposed bank-ineligible
activities would not violate section 20's proscription against an
affiliate being "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible securities
activities. 93
The Board then addressed the Bank Holding Company Act
issues, and upheld as closely related to banking the proposals for
underwriting commercial paper, 94 municipal revenue bonds, and
1-4 family mortgage-related securities.9 5 Finally, the Board held
that the public benefits of the proposals outweighed the possible
adverse effects, provided that the activities were limited in scope
and effect as provided in a rather extensive list of "firewall"
restrictions set forth in the Board's opinion.96 The Board empha-
sized that these limitations were "prudential" and that it believed it
appropriate to "proceed cautiously" in view of the fact that the
proposals "represent the first major entry of banking organizations
into the field of underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities
...." 97 It warned that it might tinker with the limitations in the
future. 9
8
Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell dissented on the
ground that bank-eligible securities were "securities" within the
meaning of section 20. They emphasized that they agreed with the
Board's decision as a policy matter, but believed that it contravened
the intent of Congress underlying the Glass-Steagall Act:
The interpretation adopted by the majority would appear to make
feasible, as a matter of law if not Board policy, the affiliations of
banks with some of the principal underwriting firms or investment
92 See id. at 478-81.
93 See id. at 481-85.
" This issue had already been decided in the Chase Manhattan Corporation case.
See Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 368.95 See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 487. The
Board did not decide on the record before it whether consumer-receivable-related
securities met the "closely related" test.
96 See id. at 502-05.
97 Id. at 504.
98 See id.
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houses of the country. Such a legal result, we feel, is inconsistent
with the intent of Congress in passing the Glass-Steagall Act.9
The Board's decision in Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust
represented a severe, although not entirely unexpected, setback to
the Securities Industry Association. But that group had not been
idle. Knowing that the Board was likely to approve further
intrusions by banks into the securities business, the SIA had lobbied
for, and obtained, a provision in banking legislation pending on
Capitol Hill that would impose a moratorium on Board approval
between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988 of any application which
would permit a bank holding company to engage in the underwrit-
ing or public sale of securities on the basis that it was not "engaged
principally" in such activity within the meaning of section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. The provision passed the Senate on March 27,
1987;100 not coincidentally, the decision in Chase Manhattan Corp.
came down on March 18, prior to the Senate's action but after the
effective date of the proposed moratorium. This provision became
§ 201(b) of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987.101
Thus the securities industry had obtained at least a temporary
reprieve from the depredations of the Federal Reserve Board.
The SIA then petitioned the Second Circuit for review of the
Board's Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust order. The
petition could have been taken up to the D.C. Circuit, but the SIA
apparently concluded that its loss in Bankers Trust II did not auger
well for future litigation in that forum. The Second Circuit,
however, proved no more receptive, rejecting the SIA's petition in
9 Id. at 505.
100 See S. 790, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 4061, 4067 (1987).
101 Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 201(b), 101 Stat. 552,582-83 (to be codified at 12 U.S.G.
§ 1841). The provision states that between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988,
[a] Federal banking agency may not authorize or allow by action, inaction,
or otherwise any bank holding company or subsidiary or affiliate thereof...
to engage in the United States to any extent whatever.., in the flotation,
underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of securities if that
approval would require the agency to determine that the entity which would
conduct such activities would not be engaged principally in such activities
Id.
Section 202 of the statute permitted the Board to issue an order during the
moratorium period pursuant to its pre-existing authority if the effective date of the
order was delayed until the expiration of the moratorium. See id. at 584.
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all respects in February 1988 (Bankers Trust II).102 The Second
Circuit reversed the Board only on its market share limitation-the
subject of a cross-petition by the bank holding companies-finding
no evidence that Congress intended to limit the activities of
securities affiliates under section 20 through any market share
test.
10 3
Meanwhile the securities and banking industries made use of the
one-year moratorium to fight a pitched battle on Capitol Hill over
proposals to reform or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. The securities
industry's apparent strategy in obtaining the moratorium was to
force the issue of Glass-.Steagall reform onto the congressional
agenda, and to obtain by legislation some sort of accommodation
under which securities firms would be allowed into the banking
business if banks were allowed into the securities business. This
strategy seemed near success when the Chairperson and the ranking
minority member of the Senate Banking Committee, Sen. William
Proxmire and Sen. Jake Garn, proposed legislation that would have
allowed banks to form securities affiliates and securities firms to
form banking affiliates.10 4  However, despite much activity, Con-
gress was unable to agree on legislation and the moratorium
expired. 10 5 The Board's orders remained in effect, however,
although they had been stayed pending Supreme Court action on
the SIA's petition for a writ of certiorari in Bankers Trust III.
Members of Congress began to make statements, apparently at the
behest of the securities industry, encouraging the Supreme Court to
grant the writ of certiorari and imploring the Court not to draw any
inferences from Congress's failure to act during the moratori-
um 10 6 or to assume that Congress would be able to resolve the
102 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 839 F.2d
47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) [hereinafter Bankers Trust III].
103 See id. at 67-68.
104 See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 16,659-67 (1987) (remarks
of Sen. Proxmire) (outlining the text of the proposed act and stating that the
legislation is necessary to modernize and constructively reshape our financial
institutions).
105 Seven bills to amend or repeal the Glass-Steagall Act were pending before the
House Banking Committee at one time. The Chairperson of the Committee, Rep. St
Germain, directed the staff to prepare a compromise committee draft, but the
committee was unable to report out a bill. See 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May
10, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Morrison).
106 See 134 CONG. REc. E1,636-37 (daily ed. May 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Rinaldo); 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Morrison).
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controversy at any time during the present geologic era.10 7 The
Supreme Court, unmoved, denied the writ.
10 8
D. Recent Developments
At this point, the initial political battle over commercial paper
was over. Banks and bank holding companies could place an
unlimited amount of commercial paper for the accounts of issuers,
and could underwrite commercial paper through a nonbank
subsidiary up to the point where gross revenues from commercial
paper underwriting and other bank-ineligible securities activities
equalled five percent of the subsidiary's gross revenues. From a
regulatory perspective, the battle now turned to the question of
whether the prudential limits ("firewalls") on section 20 firms would
be lifted, and if so, how soon.
The revenue limitation was not a serious constraint for large
bank holding companies with subsidiaries that functioned as
primary dealers in government securities. The amount of bank-
eligible securities revenues brought in by these firms was s6 large
that even very substantial underwriting was possible within the
revenue cap. 10 9 The same was not true, however, for smaller or
regional bank holding companies that did not control large primary
dealers in government securities. These firms could operate section
20 subsidiaries only at a relatively low volume of business, a factor
which as a practical matter meant that they could not operate
107 See 134 CONG. REC. E1,473 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Morrison) ("I hope the Supreme Court will not decline to grant review on the
assumption that this Congress will enact legislation resolving the issues in the case.
While this is what we should and perhaps can do, realistically speaking, the enactment
of banking legislation in this Congress is very uncertain.").
108 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
109 See Garsson, Limited Value Seen in Power to Underwrite AM. BANKER, Feb. 20,
1990, at 1 (noting that revenue limit has not proved a hindrance at Bankers Trust).
Securities affiliates ofbigbanks earn bank-eligible revenues through acting as primary
dealers in Treasury securities, as well as through bank-eligible private placements
which are likely to increase in number as a result of the newly-adopted SEC Rule
144A, Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, Securities Act Release No. 33-6862,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,523 (Apr. 30, 1990). This should greatly increase the
attractiveness of private placements by allowing rapid development of a secondary
market in privately placed securities. See Rehm, Fed Expected to Ease Limit on Securities:
Ruling Likely to Boost Underwriting Capacity, AM. BANKER, Oct. 30, 1989, at 1. But see
Will the 144A Market Be Slow Off the Mark? INST. INVESTOR, May 1990, at 25 (noting
that "now it looks as if [Rule 144A which] was touted as transforming the way capital
is raised in the U.S. could take a while to lure significant members of issuers and
investors").
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section 20 securities subsidiaries at all.110 When regional banks
and bank holding companies made their unhappiness with this
situation known,"1 the Board responded by raising the cap to ten
percent, a level which should eventually allow a substantially larger
number of bank holding companies to enter the securities business
through section 20 subsidiaries. 1
12
Bank holding companies also chafed under the prudential or
"firewall" limitations applicable to transactions between the
securities affiliate and the parent holding company. They claimed
that some of these limitations were unnecessary and that compliance
costs were high.113  It is widely expected that the Board will
reconsider its firewalls after an appropriate time in which the actual
operations of section 20 subsidiaries can be observed. 1 4  At
present, the stringency of the Board's firewalls is a matter of intense
controversy within the banking and securities industries.
Finally, with respect to banks, the Board in 1989 issued an order
allowing section 20 affiliates to underwrite and deal in corporate
bonds, including junk bonds, and, after a waiting period, in
corporate equity securities as well." 5 The D.C. Circuit upheld
110 See Parisi interview, supra note 24; see also Garsson,supra note 109, at 1 (noting
that except for large money-center banks, even large regional banks cannot generate
enough bank-eligible revenue to make a profit in bank-ineligible activities).
11 See Horowitz, Fed May Expand Securities Powers, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1989,
at 1, col. 1, 18, col. 3 (quoting an official of PNC Financial Corp., a regional bank
holding company: "For a regional company of our size it doesn't make sense to
engage in all four product lines [of bank-ineligible securities authorized by the Board]
unless we can do a large amount in each particular line"); Horowitz, Regionals Go Slow
on Underwriting: They Let Money Center Banks Take the Lead on Section 20, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 29, 1989, at 5; Rehm, Bank Victories on Securities Mostly Symbolic AM. BANKER,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 1, 13 (discussing Security Pacific Corp., a large regional bank, which
has yet to implement its securities powers because of the burdens of firewall
restrictions).
112 See Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751 (1989).
113 See, e.g., Garrson, supra, note 109, at 1, col. 1 (noting that Bankers Trust was
forced to move clearing operation for non-Treasury securities out of its securities
affiliate because of firewall prohibiting loans between insured banks and securities
affiliate).
114 The Board expressly indicated that it might revisit and revise the firewalls in
the future. See Citicorp/J.P. Morgan & Co./Bankers Trust, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473,
504-05 (1987).
115 SeeJ.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989). The Board's action
was apparently taken with careful attention to its political consequences. As to bond
underwriting, the Board was well aware that many potential opponents of expanded
bank powers had voted during the previous year to allow banks to underwrite
corporate bonds; those members were thus hampered in their ability to complain
when the Board accomplished the same result by regulation. As to equity underwrit-
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this order in April 1990.116 Thus, banks are now able, through
their securities affiliates, to engage in a wide range of securities
activities, subject to the requirement that the gross revenues from
the bank-ineligible activities not exceed ten percent of the affiliate's
total revenues, and subject also to the various firewalls against
transactions between securities affiliates and other parts of the bank
holding company. The securities affiliates of banks live again-
despite the nearly universal belief for nearly a half-century that they
had been forever destroyed by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
Securities firms, for their part, have faced still further difficulties
over the past few years. First, the legal developments which have
allowed bank affiliates to underwrite securities have not benefitted
them. All the major securities firms are "engaged principally" in
bank-ineligible activities. Accordingly, they cannot affiliate with
banking institutions by setting themselves up as section 20 subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies. Nor, under section 21, can they
engage "to any extent whatever" in deposit banking either directly
or through a subsidiary. In short, while the Glass-Steagall Act has
proved to be relatively toothless When applied to securities activities
by big bank holding companies, it retains a great deal of bite as
applied to banking activities by the big securities firms.
This suggests that the value of the Glass-Steagall Act in protect-
ing securities firms against bank competition may have been eroded
to the point where the securities industry as a whole might not be
severely damaged by repeal of the Act. In May 1990, the Securities
Industry Association took the fateful step of dropping its opposition
to repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. 117 The United States appears
ing, the Board, while approving the activity itself, announced that it would not grant
any actual approvals for a year. This deferral ostensibly allowed Congress a period
of time in which to reverse the Board, thus deflecting potential congressional
criticism. Given the paralysis that Congress has displayed on Glass-Steagall issues, few
observers seriously believed that Congress would reverse the Board's order. See
Rehm, Fed Ruling Leaves Congress Leeway, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1989, at 1, 16. As
expected, Congress took no action.
116 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir 1990) [hereinafter Bankers Trust IV]. The Court held that, having
lost on essentially the same arguments in the Second Circuit in Bankers Trust III, 839
F.2d 47, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988), the SIA was estopped from relitigating the
issue in the D.C. Circuit.
For a discussion of the potentially greater implications of the Fed's recent
decision to allow commercial banks to underwrite securities, see Sease, supra note 12,
at C1, col. 5.
I 7 See Securities Industly Accepts Glass-Steagall is Doomed, FIN. TIMEs INT'L BANKING
REP.,June 1990.
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to be taking the first groping steps towards a European-style system
of universal banking in which a single organization offers a full
array of banking, securities, and other financial services.
As a result of the developments recounted above, much of the
conflict between banks and securities firms has now been redirected
from the political to the marketplace arena. It was one thing for
bank holding companies to achieve the formal power to engage in
securities underwriting; it is quite another to establish a section 20
underwriting affiliate able to compete on equal terms with estab-
lished securities firms. Moreover, the securities industry itself
recently has faced a series of painful shocks, including the market
break of October 1987, the slowdown in corporate takeover activity
starting in 1988, the bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert in late
1989, the ensuing collapse of the junk bond market, and the
downturn in the stock market stimulated by the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Profits of securities firms were down, and a number of
firms had to lay off employees in 1990. Given these developments,
it is hardly surprising that a number of bank holding companies that
obtained permission to open section 20 subsidiaries have not yet
done so, apparently out of concern that they can not compete in an
already packed market.1 16 One bank holding company closed its
section 20 affiliate only two years after its creation.1 19 Those that
continue to operate section 20 subsidiaries have focused their
business almost exclusively in the area of commercial paper.
120
118 See GAO Report: "Bank Powers: Activities of Securities Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies, " Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1990)
[hereinafter GAO Report] (as of September 30, 1989, 21 holding company
subsidiaries had received permission to conduct bank-ineligible activities, but only 13
had actually commenced such activities).
119 See Leander, Bank of Boston Closes Sec. 20 Uni AM. BANKER, June 5, 1990, at
2.
120 See GAO Report supra note 118, at 60-61. Commercial paper represented
approximately 98% of bank-ineligible activities by § 20 firms between the third
quarter 1988 and the third quarter 1989. For example, in the third quarter of 1989,
§ 20 affiliates underwrote $386 million in municipal revenue bonds, $600 million in
mortgage-related securities, $45 million in asset-backed securities, and $67,660 million
in commercial paper. See id. Although a number of§ 20 firms had announced plans
to enter the junk bond field, as of May 1990 none had done so. See Smith, Banks See
Golden Opportunity in Junk, Wall St.J., May 15, 1990, at C1, col. 3. In June 1990,
Citicorp announced that it was terminating its municipal securities underwriting
business. See Guenther, Citicoip Will End Its Underwriting of Municipal Issues, Wall St.
J., June 5, 1990, at C21, col. 1.
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It is not yet clear whether section 20 firms will te able to survive
in the highly competitive commercial paper market. Market
participants we interviewed said that spreads were so low in 1989
that it was very difficult to make a profit in commercial paper
underwriting.121 An officer at Merrill Lynch Capital Markets
estimated that in the spring of 1989 the three leading section 20
firms, BT Securities Corp. (the Bankers Trust New York Corpora-
tion subsidiary), Citicorp Securities Markets, Inc., and J.P. Morgan
Securities, Inc., each had approximately $15 billion outstanding in
commercial paper underwritings, while the break-even point for this
business was approximately $28 billion.122 The section 20 firms
were almost certainly operating at a loss during this period.
Although section 20 firms may not yet be turning a profit, the
trend for bank commercial paper underwriting has been dramatical-
ly positive, with total commercial paper underwritten by section 20
firms rising from approximately $12 billion in the third quarter of
1988 to approximately $68 billion in the third quarter 1989.123
Recent press accounts indicate that banks continue to do Well in this
field. 124 Banks such as Bankers Trust and Citicorp show every
sign of being committed to the commercial paper market for the
long haul, both as a means of gaining an initial toehold in the
securities business and as a device for maintaining and enhancing
contact with their prime commercial customers. 125 In short, there
can be little doubt that the government decision to permit commer-
cial banks to enter the commercial paper market had a significant
economic impact.
121 See Fuscone & Smithwick interview, supra note 38; Parisi interview, supra note
24. Spreads have been low for a number of years, forcing niajor players such as
Salomon Brothers and Paine Webber to abandon the business. See Tobin, Players
Reshuffled in CP Market, EUROMONEY, June 1988, at 175.
122 See Parisi interview, supra note 24.
123 See GAO Report, supra note 118, at 106; see also, Quint, Turning the Tables, U.S.
BANKER,July 1988, at 14 (1988) (reporting the growing number 6f banks successfully
entering the commercial paper market).
124 See Tobin, supra note 121, at 175; Neustadt, supra note 38, at 1, col. 4.
125 See Rehm, supra note 111, at 1, col. 1 (reporting that NCNB Corp., a large
regional bank holding company, decided to activate a securities affiliate because, over
time, the value of bank powers will grow, and because NCNB wanted to obtain
grandfather rights in the event that Congress chose to bar further investment banking
affiliates); see also Garsson, supra note 109, at 1, col. 1 (noting that the most important
aspect of new bank powers is that banks have "an opportunity to become familiar
with corporate debt and equity underwriting in anticipation of full-scale repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act").
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III. THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
A. The Controversy in the Diet
As previously discussed, commercial paper did not exist in Japan
prior to the recent controversy. In fact, the essence of the contro-
versy was not the question of who would control the commercial
paper market, as it was in the United States, but rather whether a
commercial paper market should exist at all. Once this question
was raised, however, the conflict between banks and securities firms
quickly came to the forefront.
That conflict, although built into the structure of the Japanese
financial services industry by the Securities Exchange Law (SEL) and
its article 65, had long remained dormant. The Tokyo Stock
Exchange was bombed into ruins during World War II and had yet
to reopen in 1948, the time of the SEL's passage. Banks were
preoccupied by efforts to stay afloat given the massive damage that
the war had caused. With the general revival of the economy and
the banking sector during the Korean War boom, the banks began
to flourish and became the main suppliers of funds to Japan's ever-
expanding industrial sector. Throughout the high-growth era, banks
were highly profitable relative to the rest of Japanese industry as
they were able to enjoy the fruits of their regulated market. The
underdeveloped securities market offered few temptations.
In the 1970s, however, changes in theJapanese economy began
to destabilize the balance between banks and securities firms. 126
Perhaps the most significant change was the gradual erosion of the
banks' most lucrative form of business-providing credit to Japanese
industrial firms. In a mature economy, these firms were no longer
as desperate for credit as they had been previously. Some, such as
Toyota, amassed huge amounts of surplus cash, and, insulated from
the threat of hostile takeovers, used this cash to finance themselves,
rather than distributing it. to shareholders. Others took advantage
of new ways to raise capital that were more flexible and less
expensive than bank loans, such as issuing convertible bonds or
selling securities in the newly-accessible Euromarket.
A second problem for commercial banks, of a more technical
but still significant nature, came in the area of government bonds.
Government bonds had historically been underwritten by syndicates
of commercial banks, with resales forbidden. Banks were willing to
126 See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 4.
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underwrite the bonds despite their low interest rates because the
Bank of Japan would buy them up in open market operations soon
after issuance, in order to expand gradually the money supply. The
system broke down, however, when the Japanese government began
to issue a huge volume of deficit-finance bonds in 1976-77. The
Bank of Japan could no longer purchase all or even most of the
bonds, as such purchases would have resulted in an inflationary
overexpansion of the money supply. Left holding large, unprofit-
able government bond portfolios, the banks demanded the ability
to sell these bonds to the general public. There followed a lengthy
debate involving the banking and securities industries, the MOF,
and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This debate set the
tone and much of the agenda for the banking-securities conflicts
that have taken place since.1 27 In the end, major Securities and
Exchange Law and Banking Law revisions in 1981 allowed banks to
sell government bonds to the public.
During negotiations involving the 1981 Banking Law and
Securities and Exchange Law revisions, the securities industry raised
the commercial paper issue with the MOE. The banks opposed
commercial paper out of well-grounded fear that commercial paper
would further reduce their control of the 'market for corporate
finance. In addition, banks and other interested parties (including
the MOF) apparently expected that if commercial paper were to be
authorized, it would be through designation as a security,128 and
that banks would be excluded from the market. This expectation
was partially based on the situation in the U.S., the birthplace of
article 65, where banks had only recently attempted to enter the
commercial paper business and challenge the assumption that
commercial paper was a security. In addition, foreign commercial
paper had been designated a security under the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law (FECL) of 1979,129 which had
partially liberalized the movement of capital in and out of Japan.
127 The details of this debate are recounted in J. HORNE, JAPAN'S FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN POLICYMAKING 98-117 (1985), and F.
ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 128-36 (1989).
128 Commercial paper could have been designated a security either by amendment
to the Securities and Exchange Law, by a Cabinet Order as contemplated by
Securities and Exchange Law, art. 2, § 1, cl. 9, or by a MOF interpretive decision that
commercial paper would be treated as falling within one of the existing categories of
securities, most likely as an unsecured corporate debenture.
129 Gaikoku Kawase oyobi Gaikoku Boeki Kanri Ho, Law No. 8 of 1960, as
amended by Law No. 65 of 1979 (all untranslated Japanese sources are on file with
the authors, who have supplied the corresponding references).
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In arguing for their position, the banks raised the following
policy concerns:
(1) Commercial paper would undermine the traditional rule
requiring collateral forJapanese debt financing. Japanese finance
was based on the idea that strict collateral requirements would
control against losses in the event of default and thereby guarantee
the stability of the financial system. Since commercial paper
would depart from this principle, introduction without adequate
study would endanger investors and raise the potential for chaos
in the financial markets.
(2) Commercial paper would weaken the "main bank" system,
by which one bank acts as a corporation's principal financial
adviser and lender. The "main bank" system had played an
important role in Japanese finance, but would be undermined if
corporations were to raise funds directly from open money
markets.
(3) Commercial paper was a uniquely American product,
necessary in the United States because of the absence of interstate
banking and because of strict limits on bank loans to individual
customers. In Japan, banks had proven able to supply ample
short-term finance at low interest rates, eliminating any need for
commercial paper.13 0
Others argued that a commercial paper market would reduce
the effectiveness of Bank of Japan "window guidance," a leading
tool of monetary policy, 131 and would lead to the collapse of the
system of regulated interest rates. 132 The MOF refused to act in
the face of bank opposition, citing as its reason the lack of issuer
demind for commercial paper given ample availability of bank
financing at low, regulated rates of interest.
The securities industry was not satisfied with this result, and it
apparently asked members of the governing LDP to introduce an
advisory resolution in the national legislature, the Diet. 133  The
130 See T. AMAYA, UGOKIDASIrTA CP 75-77 (1988) (listing bank arguments). The
author of this book is ajunior MOF official and served in MOF's Securities Bureau,
Capital Markets Section during the period of commercial paper's introduction. The
book is representative of MOF views.
1s1 "Window guidance" refers to the Bank ofJapan setting a specific quantitative
ceiling on the aggregate lending of each bank. It is used only during periods of tight
mondy and has the benefit of being a very precise control on the amount of credit in
the economy. See Ackley & Ishi, Fiscal Monetary and Related Policies, in AsIA'S NEW
GIANT: How THEJAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 153,202-04 (H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky
eds. 1976).
132 Daiki-shoki: Komsharu p 5d, Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Financial Column), May
31, 1985, at 17 [hereinafter Daiki-shok4 May 31, 1985].
s This resolution supported the demands of the securities industry, and yet our
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Finance Committee of the House of Representatives passed such an
advisory resolution stating that "in order to advance international-
ization and the diversification of financial products, the legal and
practical aspects of introducing commercial paper should be
studied." 13 4  The resolution was plainly directed at the MOF,
since the commercial paper question was under its banking and
securities regulation jurisdiction. This one-sentence advisory
resolution is the only evidence of Diet involvement in the decision
to introduce commercial paper, and it appears to have had little or
no impact on the final decision. The MOF took no action in
response to it, having already determined not to act on commercial
paper at that time. When the MOF did act after five years, it did so
for reasons entirely unrelated to the resolution.
1 3 5
The Ministry's steadfastness in the face of pressure from the
legislature is not surprising. While in theory the Diet has great
power over the MOF, in practice the relationship between the MOF
and the Diet is almost the reverse. The MOF has long been the
dominant forum for decisions over financial services. Resort to the
Diet usually takes place at the MOF's behest, when a desired policy
change cannot be implemented under the existing statutes.
One reason for this custom is that the Diet lacks the staff,
expertise, or prestige to pass legislation significantly interfering with
the MOF's freedom of action. Japan has a long tradition of the best
and brightest students entering the government ministries,
particularly the MOF. The MOF recruits heavily from the Law
Faculty of the University of Tokyo, and takes the undisputed cream
of the crop, the top of the clearly defined Japanese educational
interviews with key participants in the process left us uncertain as to its actual origin.
One possibility is that the MOF favored early introduction of commercial paper, but
was unable to overcome strong bank opposition. If that were the case, the MOF may
have acquiesced in or even indirectly sponsored the Diet resolution. The resolution
was vague enough so as not to unduly restrict future MOF action, yet specific enough
to provide MOF a basis for later reviving the commercial paper debate with the
banks. We believe, however, that the evidence points to a source within the securities
industry.
134 Japanese Diet, House of Representatives, Finance Committee Advisory
Resolution (Okura iinkai nofutai ketsugi) (May 13, 1981), reprinted in T. AMAYA, supra
note 130, at 68.
135 The question of relations between the Diet and the ministries is an extremely
sensitive one. While the MOF officials we interviewed were quite open and
forthcoming about relationships within the MOF and with interest groups, they would
speak about the Diet in only the most general terms. Of course, this relationship
involves the senior MOF officials.
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hierarchy. The Diet, in contrast, has few specialists, and its staff
consists largely of privately-funded political workers. 136
Moreover, in Japan's highly regulated system, MOF decisions
over the powers and activities of the banking and securities
industries are ongoing, since individual firms need the MOF's
permission to receive licenses or to undertake numerous transac-
tions. It is in the interests of both the banking and securities
industries to keep these decisions in a single forum, so as to ensure
even-handedness and predictability. If the MOF were to sacrifice
bank interests to the interests of issuers, investors, or securities
firms in making one decision, the banks would be in a position to
demand assurance of favorable consideration when the next
decision arises. As a consequence, the banks and securities firms
are able to "bargain" through the MOF, and attempt to find
mutually advantageous solutions on a range of issues. The banking
and securities industries have extensive experience dealing with the
MOF and they recognize it is often in their best interests to accept
its decisions. Thus, the MOF can make compromises, and, unlike
U.S. administrative agencies, it can enforce those compromises
without fear of litigation or effective after-the-fact legislative
opposition from either industries within the MOF's jurisdiction or
unrepresented interest groups. If the securities firms were to have
taken the commercial paper issue to the Diet, not only would they
have had no assurance of fair treatment, but they would have had
no way of knowing how the Diet would respond, whether other
issues would be raised oir traded off in response, or whether an
unfavorable result could be compensated for in the future. A
bidding war for influence in the Diet on a single issue would not
have assisted either the banks or securities firms in the process of
ongoing regulatory decisions.
Finally, all the participants in the commercial paper struggle-
banks, securities firms, and issuers-were constituents of the
conservative, business-oriented LDP. The LDP's best strategy was
to defer the decision to the MOF, rather than risk a political battle.
Moreover, the Diet contains representatives of opposition parties as
well as of the LDP. Since the LDP, as the ruling party, is closely
allied with the bureaucracy, a shift of resources to the Diet would
only serve to empower the: opposition parties by bringing them into
'
3 6 See, e.g.,J. HoRNE, supra note 127, at 193-98 (describing career patterns at the
MOF).
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the debate, and would diminish the ultimate control exercised by
LDP constituencies.
1 3 7
Although the 1981 Diet resolution did not induce the MOF to
act, issuer and securities interests made one further effort to move
the debate forward. In 1982, the commercial paper issue was taken
up in the Industrial Structure Council of the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI). 3 8 MITI has authority over the
manufacturing industry generally, as well as the trading companies
who were expected to (and have in fact) become the largest issuers
of commercial paper. It generally represents the concerns of its
industrial constituency in interagency debates and could be
expected to lobby on their behalf. But bank representatives also sat
as members of MITI's Industrial Structure Council, and their strong
opposition to commercial paper led the Council to issue a final
report citing divided opinion over the commercial paper issue.
139
This inconclusive result, and the feeling that it would be fruitless to
continue discussion without the participation of the MOF given its
primary jurisdiction over banking and securities regulation, led
MITI to drop the issue. 140 Thus, the first round ended with the
MOF refusing to act, and two efforts to circumvent its authority
coming to naught.
137 For this reason, when the Diet does become involved, the meaningful debate
often takes place not in the formal Diet committees, but in the LDP's party
committees. The opposition parties have not taken advantage of the apparent
opportunities to gain support from consumers of financial services by opposing MOF
and LDP positions.
138 The Industrial Structure Council is one of the MITI's standing advisory
councils, orshingikai. These councils provide formal advice to the ministries. Their
membership is chosen by the relevant ministry, and generally includes industry
representatives, academics, journalists, elder statesmen, and even an occasional
consumer advocate. They meet regularly, receive presentations from ministry
officials, and are consulted as proposals are prepared.
Shingikai provide a check on agency action, as legislative or regulatory proposals
generally do not go forward without the approval of the relevant shingikai, and the
shingikai operate based upon consensus. Perhaps equally important, the shingikai
legitimize bureaucratic decisions by giving them the imprimatur of a group of
respected citizens outside the bureaucracy.
Formal standingshingikai, created by statute, advise either individual bureaus or
entire ministries. When useful to the bureaucracy, ad hoc shingikai have been formed
to study particular issues, or to provide viewpoints which the standing shingikai do
not support. The commercial paper case provides one example of the various
shingikai in operation.
139 See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 68; Daiki-Shoki May 31, 1985, supra note 132,
at 17.
140 See Interview with Yoshiaki Koyama, Director, Research Division, Banking
Bureau of the MOF, and with other MOF officials in Tokyo (June 24, 1988).
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B. The Changing Landscape: Financial Liberalization
from 1982 to 1985
After these events, little further formal discussion concerning
the introduction of commercial paper took place until early 1986.
In this interval, however, the environment in which the commercial
paper debate took place changed drastically.
Japan had undergone gradual financial liberalization since the
late 1970s, including revisions of the FECL in 1979141 and the
Banking Law in 1981,142 and numerous regulatory changes insti-
tuted by the MOF. New financial markets had opened up as
regulators and regulated parties alike determined to make Tokyo an
international financial center. Banks were allowed to issue
negotiable certificates of deposit in 1979; this new market quickly
joined the call, bill discount, and gensaki markets as one of the
principal short-term money markets. The 1981 Banking Law clearly
defined bank powers to deal in government bonds, and retail sales
of public bonds by banks began in April 1983. The system of
regulated interest rates came under pressure from new, market-rate
products, as liberalization of foreign exchange rules gave large
borrowers and investors a way around the regulated domestic
markets, and new domestic products such as money market
certificates were introduced.
Liberalization proceeded slowly, however, due to a lack of
regulatory momentum. This momentum was soon provided by
foreign pressure (referred to in Japanese by the term gaiatsu).
During 1982 to 1984, the U.S. global trade deficit and the bilateral
deficit with Japan reached unprecedented levels. 143 Part of the
blame for U.S. trade performance fell on the strong dollar and weak
yen, a phenomenon that might have been explained by high interest
rates brought on in part by the U.S. federal government budget
deficit, but which some U.S. officials preferred to attribute to
closed, regulatedJapanese financial markets that depressed demand
for the yen and increased demand for the dollar, and even to
market manipulation by a mysterious Japanese conspiracy. This
supposed link between restricted Japanese financial markets, an
141 SeeJ. HORNE, supra note :[27, at 153-64.
142 See id. at 107-12.
143 See KEIzAI KOHO CENTER, JAPAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS, "JAPAN 1985: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON" 48 (1985).
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overvalued dollar, and poor U.S. trade performance led to U.S.
demands for Japanese financial liberalization.
144
Financial liberalization received top priority during President
Reagan and Treasury Secretary Regan's visit to Japan in November
of 1983. Ajoint U.S.-Japanese press statement listed eight areas of
potential liberalization and announced that MOF and the Treasury
Department would establish a Working Group on Yen/Dollar
Exchange Rate Issues. The Working Group met during the Spring
of 1984, and on May 29, 1984 issued a report detailing a variety of
deregulatory measures. 145 One result of this activity was to revive
the debate on whetherJapan should authorize a domestic commer-
cial paper market.
Although U.S. demands appear to have acted as the catalyst for
this chapter of Japanese financial deregulation, the influence of
domestic interests favoring deregulation should not be underesti-
mated. These interests welcomed foreign pressure that would help
them achieve their goals. Japan has a long tradition of domestic
groups using foreign pressure to serve, their interests, going back to
the time Commodore Perry forcedJapan open to the outside world.
In the commercial paper case, the large banks and securities firms
faced slowly declining benefits from the old system of regulation,
and saw great opportunities from deregulation and the emergence
of Tokyo as an international financial center. The smaller, less
competitive financial institutions and other interests favoring the
status quo would have vetoed such change under normal circum-
stances. By overriding such opposition, the foreign pressure tipped
the scales in favor of accelerated liberalization. Once the Yen/
Dollar discussions had begun, the MOF quickly prepared a report
that covered other liberalization measures, and released it contem-
poraneously with the Yen/Dollar Report.
During the period up to 1984, one aspect of the debate over
financial liberalization which provided an important precedent for
domestic commercial paper was the decision to allow sales of
foreign commercial paper to investors in Japan. The participation
of banks and securities firms in these sales was much discussed.
The 1979 revision of the FEGL relaxed the regulation of monetary
144 See, e.g., F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 50-95 (discussing foreign pressure
for liberalization); KINYf: JIYUKA TO EN NO KOKUSAIKA 79-95 (Kinyii Zaisei Jij5
Kenkyfikai ed. 1985) (recounting events leading up to the establishment of the
Yen/Dollar Working Group, and the various proposals put forward by that group).
145 For a discussion of the Regan visit, see F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 73-75.
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flows in and out of Japan and raised the possibility that, when the
proper regulations had been promulgated, Japanese investors could
purchase foreign commercial paper and other short-term financial
instruments. The revised FECL defined "security" by a list of
traditional securities similar to that in the SEL, and, also as in the
SEL, allowed for designation of other instruments as securities by
Cabinet Order. The MOF used this catch-all provision of the
FECL's security definition to designate foreign commercial paper a
security for purposes of the FEGL. The securities firms asked the
MOF to designate similarly foreign commercial paper a security
under the SEL, which, pursuant to article 65, would have excluded
banks from sales of foreign commercial paper in Japan. But the
banks lobbied successfully for equal participation in sales of foreign
commercial paper. The MOF completed draft rules for foreign
commercial paper sales in 1982.
In the end, introduction of foreign commercial paper was
delayed because of bank unhappiness over the plans of securities
firms to sell foreign commercial paper that performed as if it were
yen-denominated commercial paper, and thereby to hedge exchange
risk. Banks saw such a yen-based instrument as direct competition
for their large-scale domestic deposits and a threat to their control
over short-term money markets. After the U.S. pressure for
liberalization increased, the MOF finally arrived at a compromise
between the two industries. On April 1, 1984, the foreign commer-
cial paper sales went forward under the 1982 rules, with the
exception that securities firms were required to maintain special
accounts with authorized foreign exchange banks in order to receive
payments. 1 46  This special account requirement gave banks a
share of the business, even if it was unnecessary for providing
adequate service or investor protection.
1 47
One final change between 1981 and 1986 occurred not in Japan
but in Europe. France, England, and the Netherlands all responded
146 See, T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 55-61 (describing details leading up to the
opening of sales of foreign commercial paper).
147 Other decisions regarding bank-securities firm competition were made during
this period. In March 1985, MOF negotiated an agreement involving entry into
several new areas of business. Banks were allowed to become full dealers of
government bonds, and to enter the market for bond futures. Securities firms were
allowed to trade CDs, and to intermediate transactions in yen-based bankers
acceptances (BA). The banks were said to have gotten the better of this deal. See CP
Donyfl to Chfkoku F no Shohin Kaizen ga Nihonbashira, Kinyai ZaiseiJij6, Feb. 10, 1986,
at 34-35.
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to the growth of Euro-commercial paper markets by establishing
domestic commercial paper markets during 1985 and early 1986.
These new European markets may have influenced the decision to
establish a commercial paper market in Japan in several ways.
First, the banks had argued in 1981 that commercial paper was
unsuited to the unique Japanese financial system. Commercial
paper could be considered an American aberration, a product made
necessary because of the United States' fragmented interstate
banking system and used mainly by the United States' proliferating
non-bank financial service companies. Domestic Japanese liberal-
ization, with the prospect of further deregulation of interest rates
and financial products, had made the Japanese financial system
seem less unique by 1986. The rapid growth of Euro-commercial
paper and introduction of domestic commercial paper markets in
Europe eliminated any argument that commercial paper was an
American aberration.
More substantively, the desire that Tokyo become a competitive
financial center, and the deep-seated fear of being left behind by
western competitors, made the introduction of commercial paper in
major European markets an incentive for similar action in Japan.
These markets also proved useful models for those in Japan who
were considering what shape a Japanese market would take.
Writings on the introduction of commercial paper in Japan display
keen awareness of the new European markets.
1 48
C. The Commercial Paper Debate Resurfaces
The commercial paper issue resurfaced in early 1986 when
Keidanren149 established a Capital Markets Group to study intro-
duction of commercial paper. 150  Banks are represented in
Keidanren, as they had been in MITI's Industrial Structure Council
during that group's 1982 discussion. But the banks did not actively
oppose introduction of commercial paper in Keidanren.151 Japan's
leading financial newspaper, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, explained that
148 See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 36-43; Y. KAWAMURA, CP=KoMASHARU PRPA
(CP=Commercial Paper) 113-37 (1987).
'
4 9 Keidanren is the Federation of Economic Organizations, roughly analogous to
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce but far more influential. It representsJapanese big
business on matters of public policy, among other activities.
150 See Y. KAWAMURA, supra note 148, at 160 (noting the establishment of the
Capital Markets Group).
151 See CP, Togin mo Denya Kiun, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986, at 1
[hereinafter Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986].
1990]
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the Chairmen of Fuji and Sumitomo Banks had been appointed
Keidanren Vice-Chairmen and, in these positions of responsibility,
needed to act impartially and consider the requests of the group as
a whole, leaving banking concerns without an advocate. In the end,
no banking or securities representatives were included in the
Capital Markets Group, so that the group would focus on the needs
of issuers instead of the interests of the two industries. 152 Not
surprisingly, the result was that the Group recommended early
introduction of commercial paper.153
By late March 1986 the Nihon Keizai Shinbun recognized that the
commercial paper question was becoming a hot policy topic. A
Nihon Keizai financial column came out repeatedly in favor of
introducing commercial paper, claiming that three changes since
1981 had made the Japanese financial system a more hospitable
environment for commercial paper. First, unsecured debt financing
in Japan had become far more widespread than in 1981, with
relaxation of MOF regulations on the issue of bonds without
collateral. Second, bond rating agencies along the lines of Moody's
Investor's Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation had been
introduced intojapan, promising to make unsecured corporate debt
a less risky, more marketable product. Third, the MOF had
continued along a path of gradual deregulation of interest rates,
replacing some regulated rates and credit rationing with a market
in which commercial paper could be a competitive product. 5 4
Securities industry representatives suggested that issuer
demands for a commercial paper market should be satisfied. 155
In May 1986, the Japan Securities Industry Association announced
its own commercial paper proposal. The main features were (1)
commercial paper would be introduced; (2) it would be treated as
a promissory note rather than a security; (3) underwriting and
trading would be limited to securities firms; (4) bank back-up lines
would be mandatory; and (5) banks would be used as payment
agents. 156  Independent observers criticized the proposal as
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See Daiki-Shoki: CP no S6setsu ga Isoge, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Mar. 29, 1986,
at 15; Daiki-Shoki: Ki ga Nessuru CP Dinyft Rong, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, July 10,
1985, at 17; Daiki-Shoki: Komesharu Pjp, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 31, 1985, at 17.
155 See Yiizd o Fukumeta Rokvjyfzgojylron o Tenkai Shiy6, KinyfU ZaiseiJij6, Feb. 10,
1986, at 30-32 (Interview with Mr. Chino, Chairman, Japan Securities Industry
Association).
156 See CP Hakk6 Tegata Hshiki, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 16, 1986, at 1. The
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carving up the market, giving the securities firms the lion's share of
the business but requiring mandatory bank back-up lines and using
banks as payment agents. In that sense, it provided a nod in the
direction of banks, while ignoring the interests of issuers.157 The
securities firms presented their proposal to the MOF and the MOF
Securities Bureau's standing advisory council, the Securities
Transactions Council. At nearly the same time, the Bond Under-
writers Association (another securities industry group) announced
a survey of issuers showing widespread support in industrial circles
for introduction of commercial paper.1
58
These actions by Keidanren and the securities industry signaled
widespread interest in commercial paper and support for its
eventual introduction. Nihon Keizai Shinbun hinted that if the banks
did not shift their stance on commercial paper, they would lose the
chance to influence the details of the commercial paper market and
maybe lose the chance to participate in the market, as the securities
industry proposal would exclude banks.' 5 9 These developments
necessitated some kind of bank response.
The major banks considered the issue again during the summer
at the July 1986 City Bank Roundtable (toshiginki konwakai). There
was no formal or announced change in bank opposition to commer-
cial paper. Bankers continued to insist on the need for further
study of experience abroad with commercial paper. Likewise, they
cited recent failure of the newly established market in yen-based
bankers' acceptances as evidence that short-term financial markets
were not yet mature enough to support a commercial paper
market.1
60
Nevertheless, bank opposition appeared to weaken. Some banks
changed their positions, recognizing that banks' traditional lending
to corporate customers had become less profitable as the biggest
corporations could gain access to capital markets directly. Within
the major banks, those departments interested in expanding their
proposal was a result of a series of meetings of vice presidents of the Big Four
securities firms, beginning in March 1986. See Kokunai CP Ronsd ni Kishi o Ila
"Shhkenshlan" no Hamon, Kinyii Zaisei Jij6, June 2, 1986, at 14.
157 See Kokunai CP Rons6 ni Koshi o Ira "Shkenshian" no Hamon, supra note 156.
158 See CP D6nyZ ni Kigyd wa Sekkyokutek4 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 10, 1986,
at 13.
159 See Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 28, 1986, supra note 151, at 1.
160 See Daiki-Shoki: Kononareru CP Yfz4 An, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Aug. 1, 1986,
at 17; Kokunai CP: Shichigatsu Reikai made ni "Kangaekata"o Sakusei, Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6,
July 7, 1986, at 32 [hereinafter KinyFi Zaisei Jij, July 7, 1986].
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securities activities began to look upon commercial paper as a
possible business opportunity. This was partially a result of the
record profits Japanese securities firms were making at the time,
and of the growth of the Tokyo securities markets. But Japanese
bankers also were acutely aware of the Bankers' Trust litigation in
the United States, 16 1 which was reported regularly in the Japanese
financial press, as well as of the intense lobbying in the United
States for abolition of Glass-Steagall. There were at least some
reports that the efforts of U.S. banks to enter the commercial paper
market led Japanese banks to see commercial paper as a new
business opportunity.'
62
Now the banks' first priority was not to foreclose a commercial
paper market entirely but to "stop the rogue securities industry
proposal." 163 Bank opposition did not formally end until after
the internal MOF compromise of February 1987 described be-
low,164 but, according to the financial press, there was a private
memorandum circulated among the major banks at the July 1986
City Bank Roundtable detailing reasons for a shift toward a neutral
position. 165 Finance Ministry and Bank of Japan (BOJ) officials
told us that bankers presented them with widely diverse views on
the question.
There was also significant official support for creation of a
commercial paper market; the BOJ began to champion this position
and it issued an official report to that effect in January 1987.166
The BOJ shift from neutrality toward active support was partially
motivated by new CP markets in Europe. BOJ officials expressed
the concern that if commercial paper was not introduced within the
domestic Japanese financial markets, financial transactions would
simply move overseas.
167
161 See, e.g., Bankezu no CP Gy~mu ni Goh6 Hanketsu, Kinyfi Zaisei Jij6, Jan. 19,
1987, at 72-73 (reporting the decision in Bankers Trust II, discussed supra note 77 and
accompanying text).
162 See CP wa Tegata Atsukai, Nichigin, Kokunai D5nyf e Kenkai, Nihon Keizai
Shinbun, Jan. 21, 1987, at 11 [hereinafter Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 21, 1987]
(claiming U.S. banks' stance to be the source of scatteredJapanese bank support for
commercial paper).
163 Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6, July 7, 1986, supra note 160, at 32.
164 See infra text following note 166.
165 See Kokunai CPShij6 "Kokkakuzu"no K6zaikaibo, Kinyfi ZaiseiJij6, May 4, 1987,
at 38.166 See Kosugi & Dickinson, The Creation of a Domestic Commercial Paper Market in
Japan, 27 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 91, 109 (1988) (citing TANgi SHIJ6, THE SHORT-
TERM FINANCIAL MARKET 288 (Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha ed. 1987)).
167 See Nihon Keizai Shinbun,Jan. 21, 1987, supra note 162, at 11. Officials at the
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D. The Ministry of Finance Decision
Against the background of this private sector and official
activity, the commercial paper question came under official scrutiny
for the second time in 1986. With powerful forces favoring the
creation of a commercial paper market and the bank opposition
weakening, MOF officials were now more amenable to the idea than
they had been in 1981. But they faced a practical problem in
developing a procedure for deciding the issue. Under ordinary
circumstances, administrative decision-making in Japan follows well-
defined channels, with each ministry within the government and
each bureau within each ministry having clearly defined areas of
jurisdiction. It was respect for this clear division ofjurisdiction that
made MITI, the BOJ, and even the Diet reluctant to force the issue
in the early 1980s when the MOF decided not to take action. The
problem now lay within the Ministry. Two of its most important
bureaus are the Banking Bureau and the Securities Bureau, and the
commercial paper issue fell between them. Moreover, the fact that
it fell between them was not simply an accident of administrative
organization, to be resolved by a mixture of decisive action and
feather smoothing; rather, it was the very essence of the conflict.
To assign the task of creating a commercial paper market to the
Banking or Securities Bureau would have effectively decided the
question at issue: is commercial paper a banking function or a
security?
The internal structure of the Japanese bureaucracy served to
heighten the conflict. Japanese officials, who have the most
prestigious educational credentials in the nation, are appointed to
a ministry for their entire careers in government, and their
professional success depends upon their effectiveness in their
assigned positions. Although they are rotated from one bureau to
another every two or three years to avoid developing ingrained
attitudes, they devote their intelligence and energy, as well as sixty
to eighty hours of work per week, to their position at the time, and
BOJ suggested that their report, prepared in late 1986, had been leaked to the press.
As an influential institution and one responsible in part for regulating the banking
sector, BOJ's support for commercial paper could easily have had an impact on the
banks' position. Further, the BOJ report was the first official, governmental support
for commercial paper.
The major features of the BOJ proposal were that commercial paper be
considered a note rather than a security, that credit rating agencies rate the
commercial paper, and that back-up credit lines be required.
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often measure their success by their ability to take charge of
problems and develop new statutory or administrative solutions. In
addition, each bureau has. extensive contacts with members of the
industry it regulates and tends to serve as an advocate for its
interests, as well as a regulator of its activities. 168 Thus, a conflict
between two major bureaus within the Ministry was not something
that either insiders or outside interest groups would take lightly.
The MOF's solution, riot surprisingly, was to have the chiefs of
the two relevant Bureaus, Mr. Hirasawa of Banking and Mr.
Kitayama of Securities, meet together in late 1986 or early 1987 to
agree upon a decision-making procedure. The precise nature of this
procedure, and the exact chronology of events, are lost within the
misty confines of the MOF. Hirasawa and Kitayama did not sit in
the same room and discuss the details of the proposal; they were
too senior to do so and the potential for direct conflict would have
been too great. Rather, they assigned the task to their immediate
subordinates-for the Banking Bureau, Mr. Nakahira of the Banking
(i.e. big banks) Section and, for the Securities Bureau, Mr. Uchida
of the Capital Markets Section. Nakahira and Uchida, however,
were also too senior to meet together. They assigned their
assistants to deal with the issue and it was apparently at this level
that the bureau-to-bureau contacts within the Ministry occurred.
These contacts proceeded duringJanuary and February of 1987
under the direction of Nakahira and Uchida, the two section chiefs.
Our information suggests that Uchida was probably the guiding
force. In hammering out a compromise, the officials consulted
extensively with their industry contacts, generally on an ex parte
basis. They were motivated by a desire to find a solution that was
acceptable to both industries, so that the final decision would rest
with the MOF, and neither side would appeal to the Diet for new
legislation, as the securities industry had apparently done in 1981.
In addition, they wanted to have an agreement on their records
before June 1987, when many of them would be rotated to new
positions. This was particularly important to the officials in the
Banking Section, who had not undertaken any major initiatives
during the previous years.
The negotiations proceeded quickly, and the MOF informally
indicated that it had decided on a proposal in February 1987.1r9
168 See F. ROSENBLUTH, supra note 28, at 19-20 (discussing the prestige that
attaches to a position in the Japanese bureaucracy).
169 For accounts of the progress of the negotiations, see, e.g., CP Rfiru Sakusei
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This decision, as one might expect, represented a compromise
between banking and securities interests.
First, as had been suggested in both the securities industry and
Bank ofJapan proposals, commercial paper would be introduced as
a promissory note and not a security. This would enable the market
to go forward immediately, without involvement of the Diet to
create a new legal form. The promissory note approach allowed
both banks and securities firms to participate in the market, an
essential element to a successful compromise. It also allowed more
favorable tax treatment for commercial paper than for securities
under existing laws, as a graduated stamp tax would be levied
instead of a securities transaction tax. The alternative-treatment as
a type of corporate bond or debenture under Japanese law-was
unacceptable. Bank participation would have been foreclosed,
onerous disclosure requirements would have applied, and the
Corporations Law170 would have required board of directors
approval before each issuance of commercial paper.
Second, "direct paper" (commercial paper sold directly from
issuer to investor) would not be allowed. Only "dealer paper"
(commercial paper underwritten by a bank or securities firm) would
be accepted. This was described to us as allowing banks to maintain
an advantage over non-bank competitors at raising funds, consid-
ered an important point by the MOF until the terms of bank
competition with non-bank financial services companies are
resolved. In fact, since non-bank finance companies were not
permitted to issue commercial paper, this explanation seems
inadequate. Prohibiting direct paper obviously favors the banks and
securities firms, and may have been part of the effort to protect
banks and alleviate bank opposition. It also is in the interests of the
MOF, since the MOF has little regulatory authority over issuers, and
could not easily control a market where issuers dealt directly with
Ozume, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Apr. 7, 1987, at 5 (reporting that there would be 180
eligible issuers, and that back-up lines would probably be required for most issuers);
CP Hakk6 kigy6 100-sha Zengo: Rfiru Katamaru, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Mar. 19, 1987,
at 3 (reporting that only dealer paper would be permitted, predicting that only 100
corporations would meet the requirements for issuance, and noting that the MOF
planned to complete product design by June and open the market by the end of
1987).170 See SH6H6, art. 296. For a discussion-of this provision ofJapanese corporate
law, see Yoshikawa & Harada, Kokunai CP Shij6 $setsu ni Tsuite, Kiny-i Zaisei JijS,
Nov. 23, 1987, at 34, 35.
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investors. Only issuers and investors, under-represented in the
MOF decision-making process, have reason to favor direct paper.
After the February agreement, the Banking and Securities
Bureaus began to work together on the other elements of the
commercial paper market. The major decisions were made over the
next few months with further ex parte contacts between the MOF
and the two leading industry groups. Other groups were not fully
aware of the progress of events until the February announcement,
and needed quickly to organize their position. The large trading
companies, which have turned out to be the most active issuers of
commercial paper, established a commercial paper working group,
and by the end of March, had submitted a very liberal proposal to
the MOF. 17
1
Another element in the MOF's decision-making process was the
meetings of the Commercial Paper Advisory Group. Virtually every
bureau of every Japanese Ministry has a standing advisory council
(shingikai) that meets to consider proposed changes in that bureau's
regulatory activities. The precise role of these advisory councils is
a matter of debate among people we interviewed; the advisory
councils may be important sources of new ideas, or provide
guidance and information for the officials who make the decisions,
or help these officials obtain assent to decisions the officials alone
have made, or serve a purely decorative function. Whatever their
role, the MOF's standing advisory councils were of limited value in
the commercial paper decision, since each related to a single
bureau. These relations significantly constrained their advisory
functions. The Securities Transactions Council of the Securities
Bureau had issued a report in 1986 that vaguely proposed further
study, but lacked a clear recommendation. 172  The Financial
System Research Council of the Banking Bureau had not issued any
report at all. Thus, when the joint Banking-Securities process was
initiated, the MOF decided to create the Commercial Paper
Advisory Group, an ad hoc council selected from those members of
the two advisory councils who lacked any direct stake in the banking
or securities industries. The members and their positions were as
follows:
173
171 See Kokunai CP An wa Riyusha no Shiten o Kaite Iru, Kinydi ZaiseiJijS, May 25,
1987, at 35 (interview with official of Mitsui & Co.); Shisha ga Kokunai CP Hakkd ni
Tsuite no Y6btshj o Teishutsu, Kinydi ZaiseiJij6, Apr. 20, 1987, at 9.
172 See Shokentorihiki Shingikai, Shasai Hakk6 Shiji no Arikata ni Tsuite (Dec. 12,
1986), repiinted in T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 85-86.
173 See T. AMAYA, supra note 130, at 89.
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Ryuichiro Tachi Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University Law Faculty
(Chairperson)
Toshimichi Kajiki Advisor, Kansai Electric Power Co., Ltd.
Michio Kondo Chairperson, Hakuhodo (advertising agency)
Akio Takeuchi Professor, Tokyo University Law Faculty
Takuhiko Tsuruta Executive Vice President, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Inc.
Tetsuro Nishizaki President, International Management Consultants, Ltd.
Yo Maeda Professor, Cakushuin University
Shinichi Royama Professor, Osaka University
Mikio Wakatsuki Director General, General Affairs Bureau, Bank ofJapan
This ad hoc Advisory Group met only twice, once on April 23,
1987 and again on May 14.174 At the second meeting, it approved
the MOF proposal in its entirety. The limited number of meetings
and the absence of proposed amendments or lengthy debate gave
the ad hoc group the appearance of a rubber stamp. It is commonly
said that in Japan formal debate (such as presentation to an advisory
council) often follows most of the actual negotiation; this certainly
appears to have been the case with the Advisory Group. Its role was
apparently to add legitimacy to the MOF decision. Particularly in
light of trading company complaints that the proposal favored the
interests of banks and securities firms, it was important that a
neutral group lacking banking or securities representatives approve
the result. The appearance of neutrality was important for the MOF
to maintain its ability to negotiate enforceable compromises, and to
discourage the regulated industries from seeking help in the Diet or
some other forum.
This explanation of the Advisory Group's role may be a bit too
simple, however. The officials who negotiated the compromise
among themselves knew they would need to obtain the assent of the
industry groups. Moreover, the terms of the discussion in the
Advisory Group may have served as an intellectual framework for
the officials' analysis of the issue. There has been an ongoing
debate amongJapanese law professors about corporate finance, with
the theoretical school maintaining that the law should place all
corporate debt and equities in strict categories, and the pragmatic
school maintaining that the law should follow business practic-
es. 175 Professor Akio Takeuchi, of the University of Tokyo Law
Faculty, was the leader of the pragmatic school, and many of the
MOF officials, being graduates of that school, had studied under
174 See 6kurash6, CP Kondankai de Shohin Genan o Teiji, KinyFi ZaiseijiJ5, May 4,
1987, at 31.
175 See Interview with Professor Takeuchi (June 28, 1988).
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him. Takeuchi was a member of the Advisory Group, and the
discussion in the Advisory Group focused on the merits of the
pragmatic 'approach. These discussions, therefore, may have
reflected the discussions among MOF officials rather more than the
temporal order of the two would suggest.
Six days after the Commercial Paper Advisory Group approved
the MOF proposal, the standing advisory councils of the Banking
and Securities Bureaus also approved the proposal. The details of
issuing, transferring and redeeming commercial paper were worked
out between May and October, and uniform dealer contracts and
commercial paper certificates were developed. On November 2,
1987, the two Bureaus issued nearly identical notifications to their
respective industries, explaining the MOF's requirements for
issuing, underwriting, and trading commercial paper.176 These
notifications provide the only basis for the commercial paper
market. They are not based on any explicit statutory directive, and
have no binding legal effect.
77
No one was wildly enthusiastic about the final result. Potential
issuers of commercial paper were disappointed by the MOF's
various restrictions, including a minimum one month maturity date
and a restriction on the number of issuers, as well as the prohibition
on direct paper already discussed. They saw these restrictions as
efforts to keep the commercial paper market from replacing too
much of the banks' short term lending business, just as they saw the
prohibition on direct paper as an effort to include banks in
whatever commercial paper market did develop. They also objected
to the Ministry's graduated stamp tax, amounting to 0.24% of the
face value for a one billion yen issue with a one month maturity
rolled over for one year. 178 They noted that this tax put commer-
cial paper at a disadvantage vis-i-vis bank lending, to which no such
tax applies. No stamp tax, minimum maturity, issuer restriction, or
176 See Ministry of Finance, Banking Bureau, Notification No. 2825, Nov. 2, 1987,
trans. in Kosugi & Dickinson, supra note 166, at 133-34; Ministry of Finance,
Securities Bureau, Notification No. 1830, Nov. 2, 1987, reprinted in Kinyf2 Zaiseifijd,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 72-73 and Kinyii H6muJij6, Nov. 25, 1987, at 37-38 (also reprinting
various other documents of interest to market participants).
177 The MOF has ample discretionary powers over the banking and securities
industries to enforce such compromises. It does not, however, have such powers over
non-financial corporations. As Kosugi and Dickinson remark, this lack of MOF
control over issuers is one reason that direct paper is prohibited. See Kosugi &
Dickinson, supra note 166, at 115.
178 See id. at 113.
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back-up line requirements exist in the U.S. commercial paper
market.
Securities firms also expressed dissatisfaction with the MOF
proposal. They felt that bank participation had been accepted for
purely political reasons, without any discussion of the policies
behind article 65, or the potential for conflicts if the same bank
underwrites commercial paper, provides the back-up line, and ends
up holding unsalable paper. 179 Securities firms also worried that
the bank monopoly on back-up lines and payment agency business
would allow banks to gain advantage in the marketplace.
Meanwhile, the banks had lost out in their effort to prevent a
commercial paper market from being established. Their proposal
that the market be limited to fewer than one hundred corporations
had also been rejected, and instead nearly twice that number would
be eligible to participate from the beginning. Banks felt that short-
term finance was properly their monopoly, and saw commercial
paper as an invasion of their turf by the securities industry.
MOF officials considered this result-some dissatisfaction on all
sides, but with all parties willing to acquiesce in the proposal-the
best that could realistically be expected. In fact, all parties we met
with saw this dissatisfaction as evidence that a fair compromise had
been reached.
One additional detail of the MOF proposal also helped to
alleviate the mild dissatisfaction all parties felt. The proposal stated
that the structure of the commercial paper market would be
reviewed after one year of operation. Those who felt the market
was too restrictive realized that, as in other newly liberalized areas
of Japanese finance, the review would probably result in a relaxation
of requirements. On the other hand, the banks knew that if
commercial paper caused serious trouble for short-term bank
lending or bank profitability, they would have an opportunity to
present their case to the MOF.
E. The Commercial Paper Market In Practice
The Japanese domestic commercial paper market opened on
November 20, 1987, exactly six months after approval of the MOF's
proposal by the two standing advisory councils.1 80 On its first day
179 See Gink3 ni Yoru Kokunai CPnoJikohoyf, ni Mondai wa Nai ha, Kinyli ZaiseiJU6,
July 27, 1987, at 17.80 See Yoshikawa & Harada, supra note 170, at 35.
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of operation 800 billion yen ($6 billion) of commercial paper was
issued.18 1 The market grew at a steady pace with the amount of
commercial paper outstanding reaching 4 trillion yen ($30 billion)
by the end of April 1988. By the end of August 1988, it had
reached 5.641 trillion yen ($42 billion), surpassing the bill discount
market in size,1 8 2 and following the one-year review's relaxation
of requirements, it grew to over 10 trillion yen ($75 billion).8 3
Banks and securities firms were initially willing to underwrite
commercial paper at unsustainably low rates, well below the margins
required for profitable dealing. Although rates increased gradually
throughout 1988, approaching the rate for CDs, commercial paper
distribution remained unprofitable. Underwriters purchased and
distributed commercial paper only as a way to ensure a share of the
issuer's other business, deeming commercial paper "charity paper"
or "connection paper. " 184 Participants reported to us that issuers
engaged extensively in arbitrage: they would issue commercial
paper and then place the funds obtained from the issues into higher
yield bank time deposit accounts or Cds. Such arbitrage was
estimated to account for the lion's share of commercial paper, up
to eighty or ninety percent, at least until the interest rates paid by
commercial paper issuers began to increase in the summer of
1988.185- The largest purchasers of commercial paper were invest-
ment trusts, followed by the smaller regional and mutual banks,
which found that commercial paper gave a higher yield on their
funds than the call market.
186
181 See id.
182 See RitoJ6shj de Kugatsumatsu wa Genshd, Nikkei Kinyfil Shinbun (The Nikkei
Financial Daily), Sept. 19, 1988, at 1.
183 See CP-ope Raishfi ni moJisshi, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 16, 1989, at 1.
18 4 SeeJapan Commercial-Paper Market Grows Although Critics of System Abound, Wall
St.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at C23, col 1.
185 This was revealed through conversations with securities and banking industry
participants inJune 1988. The arbitrage was widely reported in the financial press.
See, e.g., Nikkei Kinyfi Shinbun, May 3, 1988, at 1 (noting that issuers were taking
advantage of "blood letting" rates and placed proceeds of issuance in large-scale time
deposit accounts); see Nikkei Kinyfi Shinbun, June 29, 1988 (reporting that the gap
narrowed between commercial paper rates and the effective interest rate on bank
borrowings, and predicting an end to arbitrage issuance). Although margins have
narrowed, arbitrage issuance continued to dominate the market into 1990. The
amount of funds in large-scale time deposits at any time is closely correlated with the
amount of commercial paper outstanding, evidencing this widespread arbitrage.186 See Kokunai CPShija ni Kekkan, Da ga Ni-Ch En i, Nihon Kinyii Shinbun, Feb.
19, 1988.
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The market in commercial paper sold under repurchase agree-
ments (gensaki commercial paper) grew even faster than the
underlying commercial paper market, and proved a welcome
supplement to the existing gensaki market in government bonds.
For the month of August 1988, total gensaki commercial paper
transactions totalled over 50 trillion yen ($375 billion).1 7
During the first few months of operation, banks and securities
firms underwrote commercial paper in relatively equal shares. As
time progressed, however, the banks' share of commercial paper
underwriting business increased to around seventy percent, leaving
securities firms the remaining thirty percent.18 8 In September
1988, the Bank ofJapan announced that it would begin open market
operations in commercial paper to increase its control over short-
term financial markets and interest rates.
1 8 9
The commercial paper market appeared to be a success with its
growth exceeding most expectations. MOF officials expressed
general satisfaction with the development of the market and no
awareness of any great problems. The banks were pleased that
commercial paper had not cut into their basic businesses as much
as might have been feared, and that they had won a large share of
the commercial paper market. The securities firms, however, were
less happy with the development of the market. They claimed that
the banks' large market share was based not on the merits of
competition, but on regulatory advantages. Market observers and
participants expressed concern with the widespread existence of
arbitrage and the apparent failure of corporations to use the market
to meet their actual needs for short-term funds. The heavy stamp
tax, along with the small number of eligible issuers, limited the
commercial paper market's potential.190 Further, the market was
closed to finance companies and securities firms, the non-bank
commercial paper issuers who dominate the market in the United
States. 19
1
18 7 See CPRyfztsfi Shijd ga Kyfikakuda, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Sept. 17, 1988, at 7.
188 This statistic was provided by MOF officials, and confirmed by market
participants.
189 See Japanese Money Markets: Coming Home, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1988, at 93
[hereinafter Japanese Money Markets]; Opun Shijd Arata na Chdsetsu Shudan, Nihon
Keizai Shinbun, Sept. 15, 1988, at 11.
190 See Wall St.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at C23, col. 1.
191 For a general discussion, see Guidelines for Domestic CP and Its Revision,
ZENGINKyo FIN. REV. No. 4 (1989).
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As promised in the MOF commercial paper proposal, the market
was reviewed in November 1988, after one year of operation, and,
as before, the decision-making process was confined to the MOF,
and involved extensive discussions with industry representatives.
The securities firms and trading companies took similar aggressive
positions in favor of market liberalization. The securities firms
proposed that the requirements for qualification as an issuer be
relaxed, with the implementation of a rating system for commercial
paper, and any commercial paper issue allowed that received one of
the two highest ratings. Issues would not be limited to corporations
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, but would be permitted for
other corporations which provide continuing disclosure. A
subsidiary corporation not meeting the requirements for issue
would be allowed to issue based upon a guarantee by its parent
corporation or a financial institution. Most importantly, securities
firms and finance companies would be allowed to issue commercial
paper.19 2 The trading companies' proposal, presented through a
trade association, differed. little.193
Under both proposals, the stamp tax would be fixed at 200 yen
per certificate, as with yen-based bankers' acceptances, the mini-
mum maturity of one month would be dropped, and the maximum
maturity would be expanded from six months to one year. Back-up
lines would be optional for all commercial paper issues receiving the
highest rating. The minimum denomination would decrease along
with that of the CD, recently relaxed from 100 million to 30 million
yen.
The banks opposed nearly all the suggested changes. They took
a passive or neutral position on implementing a rating system. They
found no need to increase the number of eligible issuers, as this
would reduce bank lending; and they found no need to expand the
scope of permitted maturities, as the greatest issuer demand
appeared to be for three month paper.1
94
The banks' strongest opposition was focused on proposed
changes in the basic structure of the market. If securities firms and
non-bank finance companies were allowed to issue commercial
192 This was revealed through discussions with Nomura Securities personnel,June
1988, and review of their preliminary draft of proposal for the one-year review. See
(Shokenkai Kara no) CP no Minaoshi ni Tsuite no Ydbihjiko (An), May 1988 (Securities
Industry Draft Proposal for One-Year Review of the CP Market).
193 See Nonbanku CP ni Hantai, Nikkei Kinya Shinbun, Sep. 29, 1988, at 1.
194 See id.
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paper, that commercial paper would resemble and compete with the
banks' negotiable CDs. The banks argued that issues based on the
guarantee of a parent company should be prevented in order to
maintain confidence in a stable, orderly financial system. Issue of
direct as well as dealer paper would be "premature," from the
standpoint of market confidence and investor protection.
195
The result of the one-year review was announced in November
1988. The MOF sided largely with the banks on the most funda-
mental issues, and reserved for further study proposals for any
changes in the basic structure of the market. On proposals for
expanding the scale of the market, the MOF compromised. A rating
system was introduced, and standards for issuance were relaxed so
that approximately 450 corporations would qualify. The number of
issuers without mandatory back-up lines was likewise increased, and
the MOF stated plans to limit back-up lines to some portion of
issued commercial paper. The minimum maturity was shortened
from one month to two weeks, and the maximum was lengthened
from six to nine months. Otherwise, the market was to continue in
operation as before. 196 These changes accompanied the Bank of
Japan's liberalization of the short-term interbank money markets,
including BOJ trading in commercial paper.197 The BOJ began
trading commercial paper, shortened maturities in the bill discount
market from one month, and announced plans to trade one-week
and three-week bills for its own open market operations. The
longest maturity of the call market was expanded from three weeks
to six months. 198 ,
The gradual approach that MOF adopted toward regulatory
change held three advantages from the Ministry's perspective. First,
it eased the impact of the changes on the affected institutions,
thereby allowing them to adjust. This was a benefit in itself and also
made it easier to pursue regulatory change in the future. The result
195 See id.
196 See Yen Commercial-Paper Market: Chinked Armour, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 1988,
at 91-92. A second review of the CP market was completed on February 15, 1990.
The number of eligible issuers again increased, to 530 firms. More importantly,
beginning in October of 1990, no bank back-up line will be required if acceptable to
a rating agency. Also, a tax law revision effective April 1, 1990, drastically reduced
the stamp tax burden on CP. The tax on a 100 million yen CP certificate decreased
from Y40,000 to Y5,000. See CP Shij6 no Genji Rf2ru Minaoshi ni Tsuite, K6shasai
GeppS, Feb. 4, 1990, at 15-27; Kokunai CPSaiminaoshi no Inpakuto, KinyTi ZaiseiJij6,
Feb. 2, 1990, at 16-23.
197 See Japanese Money Markets, supra note 189, at 93.
198 See id.
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of this lessening was that the ferocity of opposition from the
beneficiaries of regulation was reduced. As a general matter, the
institutions that rely on protected market niches may grudgingly
accept gradual change although they would fight desperately to
avoid the overnight destruction of their niche.
Second, the gradual approach also gave the MOF time to assess
the impact of a regulatory change on the financial system. This in
turn permitted the MOF to achieve its prime regulatory goal of
maintaining the stability of the financial system. A gradual
approach by regulators eases worries of financial chaos and collapse
when major changes, such as the deregulation of interest rates,
introduction of unsecured corporate bonds, or establishment of a
commercial paper market, take place.
Finally, the gradual approach resulted in a steady stream of
MOF decisions, and thus made regulatory policy-making an ongoing
process. This added to the MOF's power over the regulated
industries and made resort to the Diet as protection from the MOF
less practical. Even if an interest group could persuade the Diet to
make a satisfactory initial decision, the MOF could later change the
details. For the regulated industries, maintenance of a good
relationship with the MOF remained the preferred approach. 199
IV. ANALYSIS
Having described the events in Japan and the United States, we
turn now to a comparison of the two case histories and, in particu-
lar, to the process of administrative decision-making in these two
large, highly industrialized nations. The comparison is facilitated by
the similarity between the two nations, not only in the statutory
scheme, but also in the underlying market forces.
In both nations, commercial paper represented a threat to the
core bank business of providing short term credit to large business
enterprises. To be sure, in Japan the commercial banks so dominat-
ed the short-term credit business that there was no commercial
paper market at all prior to 1987,200 whereas in the United States
199 The gradual approach contrasts with London's "Big Bang" of October 1986,
when, following a major legislative revision, British regulatory authorities deregulated
and reorganized the London securities markets in one massive event. See, e.g.,
Marshall, The Big Bang Rocks Lqndon, L.A. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, §4, at 1, col. 2
(noting, "collectively, the changes [associated with the Big Bang] are the most
sweeping ever undertaken by any major financial center").
200 See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
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a commercial paper market had always existed, although its dimen-
sions were relatively modest until fairly recently.20 1 This meant
that in Japan banks were in the position of guarding a rent as to
which they had a near-monopoly, whereas in the United States
banks were attempting to recover a rent which had been partially
appropriated by the securities industry. Thus, in Japan, banks were
in the conservative posture of resisting change, while in the United
States they assumed the role of agitators, for reform. These
different roles, however, should not obscure the underlying reality
that in both countries banks were resisting inroads into their core
businesses of providing short-term business credit.
In both countries the fight over commercial paper was merely
one part-although a central part-of a broader set of dynamic
developments in politics and financial markets. Advances in
information and communications technology meant that sophisti-
cated institutional investors could evaluate the creditworthiness of
major industrial corporations without the need to rely on the
expertise of a commercial bank or other financial intermediary.
These technological and market developments greatly increased the
degree to which commercial paper could displace commercial.bank
loans as a source of short term credit to industry. More generally,
as the efficiency of direct investments increased, banks became
interested in entering the securities business in a variety of ways, of
which commercial paper was only the most important initial
product.20 2
In both countries the commercial paper decision was influenced
by the globalization of financial markets. In the case of Japan, the
decision to establish a commercial paper market was partly a
response to pressure from the United States and other western
governments. These governments believed that the lack of short
term credit markets in Japan impeded the growth of the yen as a
truly international currency. The Japanese were also acutely aware
of developments in the American and European commercial paper
markets. 203 Events in the United States were not influenced by
these sorts of international considerations; nevertheless, the
argument for American bank entry into the securities business was
greatly strengthened by the fact that the largest American banks
were already underwriting securities in overseas markets to which
201 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 10 & 14-27 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 143-48 & 161 and accompanying text.
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the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act do not extend. It was also
significant that American banks were competing in a global
marketplace which included powerful European banks with broad
securities underwriting powers. Thus, although the globalization of
world financial markets affected the United States and Japan
differently, the general fact remains that events in both c6untries
were deeply influenced by developments in world financial markets.
Given these similarities of underlying market forces and
economic consequences, we can trace the similarities and differenc-
es in the American and Japanese decision-making process. At the
outset, any hypothesis about a higher level of consensus inJapanese
society must be rejected. In both countries, consideration of the
issue was accompanied by intense interest group lobbying, with the
big banks squaring off against the big securities firms. Although the
conflict was more public in the United States, it was no less intense
in Japan, notwithstanding the fact that is was played out in a private
rather than public arena. Measuring the strength of interest group
pressures is difficult, but the ferocity of the conflict in Japan was
remarkable and may actually have exceeded the intensity of the
American struggle.
A. The Preclearance-Postclearance Distinction
While the level of conflict was equally great, the means by which
the conflict was expressed and resolved in America and Japan were
distinctly different. We believe that the most important underlying
difference between the two histories can be captured in the
distinction between what we call "preclearance" and "postclearance"
methods of conflict resolution. The event of "clearance" may be
identified as a generally-announced decision by the decision-maker
who is officially assigned to resolve the issue. Within a corporation,
this decision-maker might be the officer assigned to a particular
area of operations, and the general announcement might be a
business report to the CEO. In the government, the decision-maker
will often be the administrative agency that has primary jurisdiction
of the area, and the announcement will be the first official decision.
As is apparent, clearance is a relative concept. If one identifies
the firm in its entirety as -the decision-maker, rather than one of its
officers, and its first statement to the public or to the government
as the announcement, rather than a report to that officer, the
amount of conflict resolved at the preclearance and postclearance
stages will be different. Similarly, one might regard subdivisions of
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the responsible administrative agency as the decision-makers, and
statements to the agency head as the announcement; this again
would affect the distribution of events between the stages. The
reason is that clearance, as we use the term, is not a real-world
event. It is not a concept consciously available to the actors.
Rather, it is an interpretation, a means of understanding patterns
of decision-making and comparing them to one another. Its value,
therefore, is not derived from the precision with which it can be
located, but rather from its usefulness for understanding the
process in question.
One useful hypothesis that might be derived from the concept
of clearance, when it is applied to a given institution, is that the
level of preclearance conflict resolution increases as the event of
clearance is set higher in the institution's hierarchy. For example,
in a corporation, more conflicts will be resolved before a statement
is made to the public by the corporation's CEO than are resolved
before a statement is made to the CEO by the chiefs of corporate
sub-units. If empirical data indicate that this hypothesis is valid, it
would suggest that the concept of clearance is a useful one for
understanding institutional decision-making.
We believe that the concept of clearance is useful for making
cross-cultural comparisons between analogous decisions. Specifi-
cally, it is our hypothesis that when the event of clearance is set at
equivalent levels of government, Japanese government officials
resolve more conflicts at the preclearance stage than American
officials. The question of equivalence is a complex one, of course,
often beset by all the difficulties of cross-cultural comparison. In
our case study, however, the answer to this question is facilitated by
the similarity of the issue in both nations, and the consequent ease
in identifying equivalent government decision-makers.
The U.S. government decision-maker that was initially assigned
to resolve the commercial paper issue was the Federal Reserve
Board. The Board's jurisdiction derives from direct statutory
authorization. In Japan, the decision-maker was the Ministry of
Finance, which possesses comprehensive jurisdiction over all
activities by financial institutions. Clearance occurred when each
agency announced its interpretation of the governing statute
regarding the ability of commercial banks to deal in commercial
paper.
Interestingly, the decisions that constituted clearance in each
case were essentially equivalent. In 1980, the Fed declared that
commercial paper was not a security for purposes of the Glass-
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Steagall Act and that banks could therefore buy and sell it for their
own account. Because of the potential hazards, however, the Board
imposed a number of restrictions aimed at insuring that the paper
was high quality, and that it was sold to sophisticated investors, not
to the general public.20 4 The MOF's decision, announced in May
1987, and officially promulgated in November of that year, was also
that commercial paper was not a security, and that banks could
therefore participate in the newly-created market. The MOF also
imposed restrictions, the principal ones being limited issuer
eligibility and mandatory bank back-up lines to ensure the quality
of commercial paper issues.
20 5
In both cases, therefore, the agency adopted a similar approach,
ostensibly as its best interpretation of the statute, but also as a way
of going forward with deregulation, while avoiding statutory
language that could only be changed by legislative action.
20 6
Moreover, restrictions were imposed in both cases that were
ostensibly designed to decrease risk, but also intended to satisfy
conflicting interest groups, while retaining the agency's control over
the market.
20 7
There was, however, a dramatic difference between the two
decisions, despite their substantive similarity. The Federal Reserve
decision was simply the first stage in an extended decision-making
process that involved two levels ofjudicial authorities, a subsequent
decision by the Fed, and a variety of subsidiary actors and events.
The MOF's decision, however, was final; once it was announced, all
the Japanese participants agreed that there was nothing further to
be done at the time. There was a one-year review, but this was
planned by the MOF, and followed the Ministry's format.
This account describes the external appearance of events and
also reflects the views of those who participated. The Federal
Reserve made the decision that constituted clearance on the basis
of a complaint filed by a trade association representing the
opposing side. As soon as it undertook the decision-making
process, it knew that it would be sued by the loser; as soon as it
issued the decision, it knew the plaintiff would be the SIA, and that
its decision favoring Bankers Trust would be reviewed in federal
court. It also knew that the loser of the federal court battle would
204 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 45-46 & 168-71 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 48 & 168-71 and accompanying text.
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appeal to Congress. Undoubtedly, the Fed hoped it would prevail
in both these forums, but it knew that it had not finally resolved the
conflict at the preclearance level, and that there would be a great
deal of decision-making activity following its action.
The MOF, in contrast, worked hard to resolve the conflict
before it issued the decision that constituted clearance. It vigorous-
ly utilized an extensive network of contacts, at both the formal and
informal level, with both sides in the dispute, and used both existing
and specially created study groups to persuade the opposing groups
to accept the solution it devised. Once the MOF acted, it expected
its decision to be final. Those with whom we spoke agreed that it
would be virtually inconceivable for any of the industry groups to
bring legal action against the MOF. An appeal to the Diet might
have been conceivable, but, for reasons discussed above, it would be
unlikely to succeed and might well backfire. 208
The fact that the conflict between opposing forces was princi-
pally resolved at the preclearance level in Japan does not mean that
Japanese authorities were necessarily more effective in resolving the
entire conflict than authorities in the United States. The American
process reveals a range of postclearance conflict resolution
mechanisms that were not present in Japan, most notably litigation
and judicial decisions. It is a mistake to see the resort to litigation
as a breakdown in the decision-making process; rather, it was an
integral part of that process. The various participants, both private
and governmental, were able to argue their positions in the courts
and the judges added their views in developing the ultimate
resolution.
If litigation was not a breakdown in the American decision-
making process, neither was it the endpoint of that process. The
final resolution (here, as inJapan, subject to reconsideration in light
of subsequent events) was announced by the Federal Reserve, and
approved by the courts. In other words, litigation may be viewed as
one step in the decision-making process, one that is not qualitatively
different from other steps, but is rather a natural part of a post-
clearance conflict resolution. The courts themselves perceived their
decisions in this light. When the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Reserve Board's first decision, and declared commercial
paper to be a security,209 it added the broad hint that it was not
208 See supra notes 133-37 & 199 and accompanying text.
209 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 140 (1984).
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deciding that Bankers Trust's commercial paper operations
constituted underwriting.2 1 0 It thereby invited the Board to issue
a new decision on this point, a decision which could-and did-pro-
duce an opposite result from its own. 211 Similarly, when the
Second Circuit approved this later Board decision, it recognized
that this decision could be altered or reversed by congressional
action. 2
12
While litigation and legislation should thus be regarded as
conflict resolution mechanisms, like the various study groups and
planning efforts that the Japanese employed, their use points to
some basic differences between the preclearance and postclearance
approaches. Postclearance decision-making is segmented into a
series of distinct stages, with formal boundaries between them and
a decision of some sort being announced at each stage. Preclear-
ance decision-making, in contrast, is agglutinated into a continuous
process of compromise and reconsideration, without boundaries or
tentative decisions.
These relationships follow naturally from the character of
clearance as the distinguishing event. Once clearance has occurred,
and the initially responsible decision-maker has issued its an-
nouncement, the focus of decision-making must move to some other
entity, generally one withjuridical power to reverse the original one.
If the process is to be coherent, that power cannot be invoked until
the initial decision is announced; that is the reason that American
appellate courts will generally deny jurisdiction until a "final"
agency decision is made.2 13 In contrast, if the conflict resolution
process occurs at the preclearance stage, the interactions between
participants must remain fluid and informal. Otherwise, the
decision-maker's position will become apparent, and it will be
unable to organize a compromise that is acceptable to the partici-
pants.
210 See id. at 160 n.12.
211 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (describing the
Federal Reserve Board's unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
212 See Bankers Trust III, 839 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059
(1988).
213 See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-51 (1967)
(discussing interpretation of "finality" for purposes ofjurisdictional question); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (providing that"[a] preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject
to review of the final agency action").
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In essence, preclearance decision mechanisms are inherently
fluid and informal, while postclearance mechanisms are inherently
formal and segmented. Thus, to the extent that a particular society
opts for preclearance mechanisms, it will tend to adopt informal
strategies as well. Similarly, if a society opts for postclearance
decision procedures it is also likely to choose formal strategies.
Conversely, as a society adopts formal or informal strategies, it will
tend to adopt postclearance or preclearance mechanisms. It is the
linkage that is being asserted, not the direction of causality. In fact,
the relationship that forges this linkage is almost certainly a co-
causal one.
Litigation, the source of Derek Bok's recriminations against
American society, 214 is clearly a central and intrinsic element in
a postclearance strategy of conflict resolution. However, to ascribe
the choice between preclearance and postclearance strategies to a
preference for litigation is too simple. That choice relates, rather,
to the ideals and the conceptual patterns of the relevant actors. For
Japanese decision-makers, the ideal seems to be rational planning
and consensus building. Open conflict is anathema to them; they
would regard a public challenge to their announced decision as
either an insult or a disgrace. Preclearance conflict resolution
satisfies this ideal, because it seems to follow an orderly, adminis-
trative planning process which suppresses open conflict. In
contrast, the ideals of American decision-makers are openness,
fairness, and adherence to principle. They choose to make their
decision and then defend it in a public arena. To be challenged or
sued by a trade association like the SIA is a sign of independence,
not disgrace. The informal preclearance decision-making that the
Japanese employ would smack of backroom deals and supine
corruption in the American context.
This does not mean that Americans are willing to relinquish any
claim to consensus and rational planning, or the Japanese are
willing to concede that they are unfair or corrupt. But choices
between decision-making models must be made, and each choice
naturally shades toward a particular ideal. The need to make a
choice which actuates one ideal, when combined with the desire to
retain the other, causes each model to incorporate some elements
of the other, sometimes consistently, sometimes not. For example,
while the Japanese process did occur largely within the confines of
214 See Bok, supra note 8, at 575-76.
1
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the MOF, its deliberations were hardly a closely guarded secret. To
the contrary, all parties to the dispute were well-informed through-
out the MOF's deliberations, and the essential facts were widely
reported in leading financial journals. 215 The widespread sharing
of information among participants in a preclearance decision
process is, indeed, essential to the effective function of that process
with respect to decisions of any complexity, which will ordinarily be
made through a series of subsidiary decisions. The process of
vetting and consultation would not work effectively unless all parties
knew which matters have been decided already, which have been
excluded as not currently at issue, and which matters are presently
under active consideration. The point is not so much that the
dispute in Japan was resolved through a process that was secret as
that the mechanism for resolving the dispute was private-it involved
informal proceedings and extensive vetting of positions in advance
and in place of public confrontation.
Nor was the American experience wholly a confrontational,
public, litigation-driven phenomenon. There was a close working
relationship between the Federal Reserve Board and Bankers Trust
throughout the process; although the Board undoubtedly refrained
from inappropriate ex parte contacts with Bankers Trust while cases
were pending before it, there was nothing to stop private consulta-
tions between the bank and the agency prior to the initiation of
contested proceedings. 216 The same cannot be said, however, for
the big U.S. securities firms, which did not have the same sort of
privileged access to the Board and which adopted an essentially
confrontational and hostile position towards the Board throughout
the proceedings. These firms would have enjoyed better access to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, but that agency had little
power to influence the outcome of the Board's deliberations-unlike
the Securities Bureau of the MOF, which was able to influence the
outcome in Japan by virtue of being a division of the agency
charged with making the decision. 217
Thus informal contacts were important in the United States,
and, conversely, the Japanese controversy was not wholly devoid of
the type of public, confrontational, formalized process which we
have associated with a postclearance approach to dispute resolution.
These convergences between models are natural ways of satisfying
215 See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
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conflicting ideals, but they do not alter the predominant pre-
clearance and postclearance character of the two models as a means
of explaining the different characteristics of the dispute-resolution
process we observed in the two settings.
B. Comparing Preclearance and Postclearance Approaches
Having characterized the decision-making process in Japan and
the United States, the question that presents itself is how those two
processes should be assessed. This is a question of both practical
and theoretical significance. From the practical perspective,
policymakers in both nations undoubtedly want to improve their
government decision-making mechanisms. In addition, the two
nations compete for worldwide markets, and the quality of their
decision-making will affect their relative success in this arena. From
the theoretical perspective, the quality of government decision-
making in both countries should tell us a great deal about the
effectiveness of their social organizations, and about institutional
behavior in general. Since controlled experiments in governance
strategies are generally impossible, an investigation of the different
approaches adopted by two nations that possess a roughly equal
material culture, and confront similar economic problems, repre-
sents the closest possible approach to such an experimental
situation.
Assessments of this sort are, however, extremely complex.
While superficial conclusions such as Derek Bok's broadside against
litigation in America may attract attention and contribute to our
current orgy of social self-flagellation, they provide no criteria for
a real assessment.218 If we try to take a more focused approach,
however, we are confronted with the difficulty that the criteria to be
applied are themselves the product of decision-making styles. Thus,
in Japan, excellence in government decision-making is measured by
the institution's ability to achieve consensus and develop a rational
plan. In the United States, an excellent process is regarded as one
that is fair, open, and principled. The criteria for excellence, not
surprisingly, correspond closely with the ideals which guide the
decision-makers and structure their institutions. In order to make
a relative assessment of the two approaches, we need transcendent
criteria, that is, criteria that exist apart from the ideals of particular
218 See supra note 8.
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societies. For all practical purposes, however, there are no such
criteria.
Lacking any ready means for making a global assessment, the
best that can be done is to look at specific qualities, or virtues, of a
governmental decision-making process. While we cannot determine
the relative importance of each virtue, we can at least trace the
extent to which each one is fulfilled. The virtues that we will
discuss are the coherence of the process, its responsiveness to
circumstances, its efficiency, its political accountability, and its
fairness.
The coherence of the decision-making process might initially
seem greater in Japan, particularly since it resembles the ideal of
rational planning to which Japanese decision-makers aspire.
Surprisingly, however, events in the two countries reveal substan-
tially similar results in this area. The Japanese process was orderly
and rational; at each step all participants were in general agreement
about what had already been decided and was no longer open to
question, what was currently on the agenda for decision in the short
term, and what had been deferred for later action. TheJapanese we
interviewed showed exquisite sensitivity to these matters and
displayed remarkable unanimity as to the current status of particular
questions.
Surprisingly, however, the American process also turned out to
evidence a fairly orderly and well-understood decision process. The
Federal Reserve Board controlled the agenda of cases that came
before it in order to move the process forward in a gradual fashion-
deciding first the issue of bank commercial paper and a few other
low-risk debt instruments, then corporate bonds, and finally
corporate equities. In the same fashion as the MOF, the Board
proceeded with great deliberation to allow the market to develop
only under tight prudential limitations, which the Board, like the
MOF, indicated could be loosened over time if the initial experi-
ment with bank commercial paper activities proved successful. The
Board was thus able to achieve a policy objective through a well-
defined process of gradual deregulation.
It may seem as if postclearance events, particularly the litigation
and the court decisions, disrupted the Fed's decision-making
process to an extent that did not occur in Japan. But the Fed
managed to move forward despite the Supreme Court's reversal of
its initial decision that commercial paper was not a security. One
might conclude that the Fed was able to recoup its position by using
a different set of interpretive arguments. A stronger thesis, which
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might well be justified, is that the Fed managed to incorporate the
Supreme Court decision into its own decision-making process. It
experimented with the solution of excluding commercial paper from
the category of securities. Having been informed by the Supreme
Court that this solution would not work-much as the MOF might
have been informed by the law professors in its study group-it then
pursued another approach. The Supreme Court certainly contem-
plated such a course of events, and its invalidation of the Fed's first
resolution does not seem to have diverted the agency from its basic
plan.
Conversely, the Japanese process, despite its well-planned
appearance, reveals a heavy imprint of interest-group involvement.
Powerful private organizations such as Keidanren (the Federation of
Economic Organizations), the Securities Industry Association, and
the City Bank Roundtable were in regular contact with MOF
decision-makers. While these decision-makers undoubtedly thought
that they were acting for the nation's benefit, they also knew that
they had to satisfy these groups, and their decision-making process
revealed several significant changes in direction as a result. For
example, the entire planning process seems to have been initiated
in response to pressure from Keidanren and the Securities Industry
Association. Furthermore, the decision to allow only dealer paper
backed by banks was clearly an effort to de-fuse bank opposition.
While the process appears more orderly because these pressures and
counterpressures were played out at the preclearance stage, the
difference between the Japanese process and the American process
may be precisely one of appearance. It may, in fact, reflectJapan's
greater devotion to an ideal of rationality, rather than any signifi-
cant difference in the level of rationality itself.
Apart from the orderliness and rationality of the decision-
making process, another virtue of that process is its responsiveness
to outside circumstances. Here, the American version' seems
superior. Because it was segmented, with a relatively smaller
proportion of the total process occurring at the preclearance stage,
it was easier to initiate. One firm, Bankers Trust, was able to attract
the regulator's attention by sticking out its corporate neck, and the
subsequent objection by a trade association quickly produced the
first decision, the event of clearance in our terminology. The
postclearance events that led to the final decision followed in fairly
rapid succession.
In Japan, there was much more regulatory inertia. The MOF,
perceiving commercial paper as an unwelcome intrusion into the
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orderliness of its administrative dominions, remained immovable
throughout the early and mid-1980s. Neither the securities
industry, Keidanren, the 'Diet, nor the United States of America
could induce the MOF to take action. Without action by the MOF,
a commercial paper market could not develop. A private institution
taking action on its own, as Bankers Trust did in the United States,
was simply inconceivable. In short, the Japanese preference for
resolving all relevant conflicts at the preclearance stage gave the
agency responsible for clearance a virtual stranglehold on the
initiation of the decision-making process. The Japanese ideal of
consensus made MOF's decision-making rational and orderly once
it began, but it also made the process difficult to start as long as the
MOF or its principal interest group, the commercial banks, did not
want it started.
The concept of efficiency involves the cost required in reaching
a particular result. One might attempt to measure the cost of the
Federal Reserve and MOF decisions in terms of the general social
goal of wealth maximization, but that is simply too difficult, and
would carry us far beyond the scope of a study on government
decision-making. For our purposes, efficiency simply means the
costs involved in reaching whatever result was reached. The
conventional wisdom, reflected in Derek Bok's charges, is that the
American process is less efficient because of the high cost of
litigation. 219 Once again, however, this is much too facile. Both
systems are costly in the sense that real social resources are devoted
to them. The costs of the American postclearance system are more
obvious, but that is simply because they are more public. The costs
of litigation-the expensive attorneys, the voluminous briefs, the
elaborate hearings-are there for all to see. In Japan, such public
displays of disaffection are assiduously avoided, but doing so is itself
a costly process. If the conflict is to be resolved at all, there must
be extensive meetings, conferences, and social contacts with all the
interested parties. Furthermore, experts must be carefully selected
and consulted to confer legitimacy on the clearance decisions.
There is, moreover, an element of patterning which increases
costs in both systems. Patterning is meant to describe the phenom-
enon whereby each step in a decision-making process comes to
resemble the whole of the process. The phenomenon results from
the fact that the totality has moral force; it represents the society's
219 See supra note 8.
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general image about the right way to make decisions, and thereby
operates as a consciously available ideal for the decision-makers who
design each stage. Thus, in the United States, each separate stage
of a segmented postclearance process becomes segmented itself.
There are hearings and decisions on preliminary motions, interlocu-
tory appeals, and preliminary decisions. When the Federal Reserve
Board failed to act on the SIA complaint, the SIA followed with a
formal petition, triggering a final decision. This was a rather
expensive way to initiate the clearance decision that was, in the
American model, only the first stage of an extended process. In
Japan, on the other hand, the preference for preclearance conflict
resolution tends to generate preliminary negotiations prior to
meetings that are themselves preliminary. The purpose of the
shingikai (study group) meetings, for example, was to lay the
groundwork for the ultimate clearance decision. The participants,
however, were unwilling to come into open conflict at these
purportedly preliminary meetings. Thus, each meeting was
preceded by extensive negotiations, discussions and informal
contacts, often occurring over expensive dinners or in other costly
settings, that increased the cost of the decision-making process
generally. Similarly, substantive decisions were forced further down
the administrative hierarchy because any open conflict or disagree-
ment at the higher level was deemed unacceptable.
Another argument in favor of the conventional wisdom that
postclearance conflict resolution mechanisms are less efficient
involves the costs that the decision imposes upon private parties.
The lack of finality in the American decision that constituted
clearance undoubtedly imposed certain costs, as uncertainty about
legal rules will generally do. But this does not mean that the period
of uncertainty will always be longer in a postclearance system. A
particular matter can be under consideration as long or longer at
the preclearance stage, during which a similar uncertainty will
prevail. In fact, the decision-making process occupied approxi-
mately the same length of time in the U.S. and Japan, as measured
from the time the issue was raised until the time a sense of final
resolution was achieved.
There is, moreover, a countervailing phenomenon that may
reduce the cost of postclearance conflict resolution to private
parties. In the preclearance scenario, where the crucial decisions
occur in private, one party or industry group can readily possess
superior information about the final outcome. This will tend to
produce anticompetitive effects, and increase total costs to private
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parties. When issues are resolved in the open, public forums
characteristic of postclearance resolution-and assuming the
decision-makers are honest, as they generally are in the U.S. and
Japan-the parties will have: essentially the same chance of predicting
the outcome.
Another element of a decision-making process, apart from its
internal features such as coherence, responsiveness, and efficiency,
is its relationship to outside actors. Part of this relationship can be
captured by the notion of political accountability. In both Japan
and the United States, the primary decision-maker-the one
responsible for clearance-was an administrative agency staffed
exclusively by appointed officials. In both nations, moreover, the
agency was answerable to the legislature. This was true in Japan
because it has a parliamentary system, and it was true in America,
despite our presidential system, because the Federal Reserve is an
independent agency.2 20 In both countries, moreover, the agencies
were implementing an explicit statutory scheme. As a result,
political accountability can be measured largely by the extent to
which the legislature and the statutory scheme controlled the
decision-making process.
As we have noted, both Japan and the United States operate
under statutes which broadly separate commercial and investment
banking, although as the commercial paper dispute vividly illus-
trates, the separation is breaking down in both countries. Neverthe-
less, our study reveals subtle differences between the Japanese and
American approaches to statutory interpretation. While combina-
tions between banks and industrial firms are illegal in Japan as in
the United States, banks in Japan have used informal networks of
contacts, traditions, and cross-ownership to maintain the keiretsu
that continue to perform many of the same functions as the pre-war
zaibatsu combinations of banks and industrial firms. Similarly,
banks in Japan are prohibited from operating securities affiliates by
virtue of the Antitrust Law, which effectively bars holding compa-
nies of any sort. Yet as we have seen, Japanese banks do maintain
de facto securities affiliates, again through informal mechanisms of
control. In addition, although article 65 expressly prohibits banks
from underwriting securities, banks in practice do underwrite
220 We do not address here the vexing constitutional question underlying the
concept of "independent agencies." See, e.g., Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP.
CT. REV. 41 (discussing the constitutionality of independent agencies).
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corporate bonds by making a "moral commitment" to the issuer to
purchase any unsold securities and cover issuer defaults.
There are, in other words, extra-legal, or "moral" arrangements
in Japan that, in practice, appear as binding as any legal contract,
and that allow banks to circumvent some of the putatively applicable
statutory commands. These moral commitments are characteristic
preclearance mechanisms in that they depend on a private system
of incentives and enforcement rather than on any threat of resort
to the courts. The official, apparently binding command of the
sovereign is respected in form, but in substance may be subordinat-
ed to more informal arrangements.
Based on the data we studied, it would appear that in the United
States, the legislative commands regarding bank securities activities
carried somewhat more force than the analogous rules in Japan.
American courts define their task as enforcing the "intent" of the
enacting legislature. In commercial cases especially, American
courts have occasionally stepped in to overturn private arrange-
ments that preserved the appearance of allegiance to the statutory
command while in substance circumventing the law.221 American
courts may even insist on adherence to the statutory language when
an administrative agency has proposed a different reading; Bankers
Trust I is an example.2 22 And American courts will sometimes
enforce a statute in the face of seemingly perverse results, 223 at
least as long as the outcome is not absurd. 24 These are interpre-
tative doctrines characteristic of a postclearance system of dispute
resolution, in that the publicly-announced sovereign command is
given greater weight in the determination of applicable rules than
221 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 690 (1985) (holding
that stock transferred pursuant to the sale of a business is a "security" for purposes
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); SEC v.
WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (stating that the definition of "security"
under the Securities Act of 1933 requires that form be disregarded for substance and
that emphasis be placed on the economic reality of the instrument).222 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 150 (1984) (rejecting the Board's view that
commercial paper is not a "security" for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act).
223 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (stating that
the function of the Court is to discern the meaning and intent of enacted statutes and
to apply them accordingly, rather than to balance the equities between the litigants).
See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of'Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2565-
67 (1989) (stating that it would be absurd to interpret the word "utilize" in the
Federal Advisory Committee Act to extend the Act's requirements to any group of
two or more persons from whom the President or an executive agency had sought
advice).
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informal understandings that might have evolved among the parties
to the rules.
We do not mean to overstate this distinction as it applies to
legislative interpretation. Private arrangements often do receive
sanction in the United States, even when they might appear
inconsistent with the purposes of the enacting legislature-as
illustrated by Bankers Trust III and Bankers Trust IV, decisions that
allow U.S. banks to operate large-scale securities affiliates despite
the apparent intent of the Glass-Steagall Act. Conversely, the
statutory language and perceived intent of the legislature are
important in the Japanese system. The difference is subtle, and one
of degree rather than kind. Moreover, the present study considers
only a statute that was in effect imposed on the Japanese by the
American occupation forces; it is possible that the Japanese
response to an indigeneously-generated statutory command might
be quite different from that observed here. Nevertheless, we believe
that the distinction between preclearance and postclearance does
have explanatory value as applied to statutory interpretation in the
two countries. This suggests that American administrative decision-
making is more politically accountable to the non-executive
branches than is decision-making in Japan. The result is not
surprising, but its link to preclearance decision-making styles is
significant.
A final consideration, which involves another aspect of the
decision-maker's relationship to outside actors, is fairness, that is,
how fully each affected party was able to make its views known and
participate in the decision-making process. Where individuals are
involved, we in the United States recognize this consideration as due
process, and we have concluded that it offers benefits for both the
accuracy of the result and the subjective feelings of the participants.
The same is probably true for institutional participants such as those
involved in the commercial paper conflict.
Fairness is an explicit ideal of American decision-makers, but in
a number of ways the Japanese process achieved this ideal more
successfully. The primary decision-maker in the United States was
almost exclusively concerned with the welfare of the banking
industry. While the Federal Reserve is a conscientious regulator
and cannot be described as being "captured" by the banking
industry, the restrictions the Fed imposes, like the latitude it allows,
are designed to foster the safety and soundness of banks. Securities
firms are largely outside the Federal Reserve's concern and were
thus forced into the role of the decision-maker's adversary. The Fed
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allowed this situation to prevail because it did not need to resolve
the conflict at the preclearance stage; other decision-makers
participated after the event of clearance, and the Fed played the
role of advocate before those decision-makers, leaving them to
provide a forum for participants like the securities firms. Given the
Fed's dominant role, however, and its ability to control the result
despite the presence of other decision-makers, its adversarial stance
toward the securities firms left them largely excluded from the
essential aspects of the decision-making process.
The MOF was placed in an essentially different position. To
resolve the commercial paper conflict effectively at the preclearance
stage, it was obligated to respond to the concerns of both banks and
securities firms. It was able to do so because it regulated both fields
and thus possessed direct channels of communication with the
major industry participants. Often, the relationship between MOF
officials and members of the private firms dated back to their
college years, especially to the law department at the University of
Tokyo from which many participants in the controversy had
graduated. Large banking and securities firms also maintained good
relations within the MOF by deputizing junior officers to spend a
year working there at company expense. In the other direction,
senior MOF officials are generally required to retire from govern-
ment service at age 55, after which they often find important and
profitable positions in the private sector. 225
Within the MOF itself the Banking Bureau and the Securities
Bureau came into intense competition over the issue of commercial
paper. Both bureaus viewed their mandate, in part, as representing
the interests of their industry segment within the MOE. At the
same time, the MOF's internal policy is to move policy-making
officers from bureau to bureau every two or three years. Thus,
MOF officials do not come to identify their personal interests totally
with the interests of their bureau; the extensive circulation of
individuals from bureau to bureau allows the development within
the MOF of a network of relationships that permits a form of
preclearance within the agency. Thus it was possible for the
fundamentals of the commercial paper compromise to be estab-
lished by a simple process of negotiation between banking and
225 The process is known colloquially as "amakudari" (descent from heaven). See
E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that "[iUn a ministry, when one of the
members of a class reaches the top bureaucratic post of vice-minister probably in his
early fifties, all the others must be retired").
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securities bureaus, without the intervention of any outside
force.226
The MOF's ability to respond to the concerns of all participants
was not simply the product of its broader jurisdiction, but repre-
sented a conscious decision-making strategy. This is demonstrated
by the existence of another group of participants who lay outside of
the MOF's jurisdiction-the industrial firms that would become the
major issuers of commercial paper. InJapan, their presence was felt
through Kaidanren, essentially their trade association, and through
the formidable agency that possessed regulatory jurisdiction over
their activities, MITI. The MOF was able to include MITI in its
decision-making process, and thereby respond to groups that are
outside its jurisdiction. Certainly, the groups MITI represented did
not have as much influence as the banking or securities industries,
but they did have a channel for expressing their views, which is
more than was available in the United States.
Thus, the Japanese process seems more fair than the American
one, despite the fact that fairness is an explicit value of American
decision-making, and a principle by which our decision-making
process is designed. But the American process is just as coherent
and probably more responsive to changing circumstances, even
though these characteristics are an explicit ideal in Japan. Perhaps
the irony is too tempting here and suggests caution about these
conclusions. The main point, however, is that decision-making is a
complex process, and one cannot take a nation's statements about
itself, either positive or negative, at face value. This leads us to our
final question, namely, the extent to which differences in decision-
making strategy reflect differences in culture.
C. The Influence of Culture
As we have seen, neither preclearance nor postclearance conflict
resolution is obviously superior as a decision-making strategy. Each
has its virtues, and each has its disadvantages. More important,
perhaps, is that the differences between them are subtle ones; both
strategies exhibit roughly similar abilities to handle complex
226 One set of relationships was not marked by extensive networks of informal
contacts: those between the banking and the securities industries themselves. Those
relationships were apparently conceived of as fundamentally rivalrous, so that the
maintenance of contacts would have been fruitless. Industry officials we talked to
indicated that a private settlement of their dispute without the intermediation of the
MOF would be virtually inconceivable.
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administrative problems. This suggests that the choice between
them may indeed be a matter of cultural preference, and not an
indication that one nation is more rational or more efficient than
the other.
Other studies of Japanese and American society suggest that
their choices of decision-making strategies are reflections of much
broader cultural styles.227 The Japanese concern with consensus
and their desire to avoid open conflict are well-documented.228
Perhaps they derive from the homogenous and highly-centralized
nature ofJapanese society, its need is to find modes of cooperation
in a densely-populated region, and its emphasis on tradition and
efficient governance as sources of legitimacy. America, in contrast,
displays a penchant for formalized decision-making and structured
confrontation, perhaps a product of a pluralistic, widely-dispersed
society that derives its legitimacy from concepts of law and
individual autonomy. Generalizations of this sort are dangerously
malleable, but the basic pattern has been repeatedly observed.
Despite the possible cultural origin of the Japanese and
American decision-making processes, one cannot simply conclude
that we are dealing with two different kinds of human beings. To
assess the similarity or difference between decision-makers in Japan
and the United States, we must decide whether differences in
culture operate as a conceptual framework or a situational context.
If they operate as a conceptual framework, then people in the two
countries really are different in an essential way. They think
differently, and strategies that come naturally to one people are
literally inconceivable to the other. The Japanese themselves often
take this position. A number of the people we interviewed stated
that it would simply be inconceivable for a bank to begin issuing
commercial paper without regulatory approval, the way Bankers
227 See, e.g., E. REIsCHAUER, supra note 1 (noting that "the dictatorial power of the
occupation and the dire economic conditions of the time produced ... a more
comprehensive and delicate system of cooperation between government and business
than had ever existed before"); P. TASKER, supra note 1, at 47 (remarking that "the
strength of the consensus model is ... a habit of thought shared by households,
bureaucrats, managements and workers, confirmed by the systems and customs by
which the social group functions").
228 See, e.g., E. REISCHAUER, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that "[i]f the Japanese
have a special decision-making process, it is the system of careful and extensive
consultation before a decision is arrived at by general consensus"); P. TASKER, supnra
note 1, at 68 (stating that "[i]mportant decisions are made at middle-managcmcnt
level through a process of consensus-building").
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Trust did, or for a trade association to sue a regulator, which the
American SIA did quite often, and with enthusiasm.
But culture may also operate as a situational context in which
decision-makers and decision-making agencies must function. Given
a culture that generally values consensus and that has organized its
institutions around compromise, a rational decision-maker would
seek to achieve its goal through compromise and consensus. This
behavior might not stem from an inability to conceive of alterna-
tives, but rather from a recognition of the prevailing realities. It
would have been senseless for the MOF to abandon its study groups,
eliminate its carefully established network of industry contacts,
release its control of the process, and seek a resolution in court.
The MOF had a system of conflict resolution that worked reasonably
well, and there was no good reason to dismantle it. Similarly, the
Federal Reserve was prepared to reach an initial decision in
response to an industry complaint, and then defend that position in
court. There was no reason to establish an elaborate system of
negotiation, since the Fed would probably have been sued anyway,
perhaps by both sides instead of one. Moreover, efforts to negotiate
with industry representatives might have been seen as illegitimate
ex parte contact or unsavory overinvolvement with private interest
groups.
Proponents of the cultural approach could argue that the
rational decision-maker model fails as an explanation because it
artificially isolates the decision-maker from its surroundings. The
norms of decision-making in Japan and America are different
because the two cultures are different; to posit the entire, pre-
existing culture as a given, and then look at a single, isolated
decision may not make much sense. But there is a certain validity
to this approach from the decision-maker's perspective. If the
decision-maker's conceptual framework is totally structured by
cultural norms, alternative strategies will not even be considered;
they will be inconceivable in a very real sense. In contrast, if the
decision-maker is choosing, as a rational actor, to follow certain
rules because they are cultural norms, alternative strategies will be
conceptually available. For the most part, they will be rejected, but
they will be considered arid occasionally adopted. In other words,
when culture operates as an external constraint, rather than as a
conceptual framework, its control is looser, its admitted suzerainty
less absolute.
As might be expected, the commercial paper conflict indicates
that both situations occurred: the decision-makers were rational
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actors on some occasions and cultural actors on others. Our
Japanese informants said that litigation against the MOF was
inconceivable, but the very fact that they could say it meant that
they could conceive of it at some level and simply regarded it as
very, very inadvisable. In fact, the securities firms apparently did try
to circumvent the MOF's decision-making process by appealing
directly to the Diet. Had the Diet acted, that would have constitut-
ed the event of clearance, and MOF implementation of the new
statute would have constituted a series of postclearance events. The
securities firms knew that Diet action was unlikely, but they
appealed to the Diet in order to put pressure on the MOF.
Essentially, they could conceive of and use alternative strategies.
Conversely, the Federal Reserve was in contact with the securities
firms, and was willing to compromise by placing restrictions on the
commercial paper activities of banks. A preclearance resolution was
presumably conceivable in this situation, and we know that such
solutions are often reached by American regulators.
In the final analysis, however, distinctive cultural patterns did
prevail. The Japanese resolved the issue in private, through a series
of preclearance negotiations within a single agency, while the
United States resolved the conflict through a succession of adminis-
trative and judicial adjudications of a relatively formal and ad-
versarial character.
Thus, there is no simple answer to the debate between cultural
and rational actor explanations of American andJapanese decision-
making. The reason is that both systems of explanation acknowl-
edge the crucial role of the institutional setting in which decisions
are made. For cultural theorists, the institutional setting is the
embodiment of culture, and particular decisions reflect that same
culture in a fashion that makes them continuous with, and indistin-
guishable from, their setting. For rational actor theorists, the
institutional setting creates the framework of rewards and punish-
ments, of opportunities and constraints, which serves as the only
possible basis for evaluating action. In other words, human
behavior is contextualized in a decisive way that precludes any
global distinction between actions controlled by culture and actions
based on independent motivations whose consequences are defined
by culture.
One might attempt to retrieve crisp distinction between cultural
and rational actor explanations by using them to account for the
institutional context itself. Clearly, institutions are products of
human behavior, and those behaviors presumably lend themselves
1990]
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to cultural or rational actor explanation. The problem, however, is
that there is no initial state, no moment beyond history when
institutions are created and then set in motion. Thus, the behaviors
that cause institutions to develop are themselves contextualized in
precisely the way that precludes the distinction between culture and
rational action. The commercial paper decision, although it is the
subject of the present study, and can thus by regarded as occurring
against a particular institutional background, was also a stage in the
development of institutions that will affect further actions.
Government officials and. executives of banks, investment banks,
and issuing corporations -will have their behavior conditioned by a
set of institutions which includes the new commercial paper market,
or will need to take that market into consideration when determin-
ing their own self-interest, or-most likely-will do both.
Even if one were prepared to choose a primary force in shaping
institutions, that choice might not determine the contours of those
institutions in a decisive way. A new way of looking at dynamic
systems, called chaos theory, suggests that very small discrepancies
between two similar systems will tend, over time, to produce major
differences-differences so great, in fact, that the end result of the
two systems will have no resemblance to each other, despite their
initial similarity.229 Thus, a minor admixture of cultural influenc-
es in a rational action system, or rational actor influences in a
cultural system, may be sufficient to destroy the predictive value of
the primary explanation. 23 0
But all of this is a dilemma only if one accepts the framework of
current scholarship, that is, if one feels obligated to choose between
cultural and rational actor explanations. A better approach is to
regard these two models of explanation as alternative means of
accounting for observed phenomena. One can apply each in turn,
or better still, one can apply them simultaneously, and accept
accounts that can be justified only by both explanations. This
recognizes the fact that we perceive behavior in both cultural and
rational actor terms, and that the actors themselves respond to both
types of motivations.
We have proposed precisely this kind of dual explanation for the
distinction between Japan's preclearance conflict resolution and
American's postclearance approach. The distinction emerges from
22 9 See generally, B. MANDELBOT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE (1977); H.
PEITGEN & P. RICHTER, THE BEAUTY OF FRACTALs (1989).
230 SeeJ. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 59-80 (1987).
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the cultural proclivities of executives and officials in the two
nations, but each mode of behavior made sense to the participants
in rational terms, and could be justified in those terms. This dual
approach does not abandon the enterprise of explanation, but
rather increases its possibilities. By using both approaches, we can
treat individuals as rational actors, whose behavior is predictable at
the individual level and comprehensible to other human beings
from different cultures. At the same time, we can discern general
patterns that distinguish cultures, and that reflect differences in
attitude as well as circumstances.
Simultaneous explanation is particularly important when dealing
with sophisticated nations that interact with one another. To
account for interactions of this nature, one must recognize cultural
difference and yet allow for comprehension and learning between
cultures. This is certainly true of the commercial paper decision.
Japanese and American decision-makers were aware of each other's
actions, and their own behavior was affected by that knowledge. At
the technical level, the Federal Reserve knew that America's major
commercial competitors, including Japan, allow their commercial
banks to engage in a wider range of securities activities. Its decision
to authorize the Bankers Trust program, therefore, was partially
designed to move American banks closer to the European-Japanese
mode. The MOF, on the other hand, was directly influenced by the
existence of commercial paper markets in the United States and
other countries, and understood the industrial firms' desire to
increase their access to capital markets. Thus, each nation's
decision-makers were able to learn from each other, and respond
rationally to the challenges its economic rival presented. At the
same time, they interpreted what they leai~ned in their own cultural
context, and offered culturally distinct responses.
More generally, decision-makers in both nations are aware of
each other's decision-making styles. Derek Bok's complaints are just
one reflection of the self-evaluation which any large, sophisticated
society undertakes. Knowledge of other cultures provides a means
of conceptualizing different approaches, of standing apart from
certain culturally embedded patterns and evaluating their desirabili-
ty. Decision-makers in each culture continue to evaluate other
cultures from their own cultural perspective, of course, but the
interplay of perspectives is capable of releasing creative energies,
and improving the decision-making process according to the
decision-makers' own criteria. This paper is an effort to contribute
to that process of cultural self-evaluation.
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CONCLUSION
We have examined the method by which both Japan and the
United States allowed banks to enter the business of underwriting
and distributing commercial paper at about the same time. These
developments, which are enormously significant for financial
markets in both countries, present a unique vantage point for
comparing and contrasting their administrative processes for
dispute resolution. We find that the marketplace dynamics in the
two countries were remarkably similar: in both countries, commer-
cial paper represented a threat to the core banking business of
extending short term credit to large business firms. In both
countries, the banks sought to protect that core business against
inroads by the securities industry. Both cases involved intense
interest group lobbying, and in both, the outcome of the process
was a period of cut-throat price competition between new bank
entrants and the existing underwriters. Both cases were affected by
globalization of financial markets, although in different ways.
At the same time, the case studies present some remarkable
differences between the two countries' approaches. In Japan, the
process was largely contained within the four walls of a single
agency, the Ministry of Finance, although other agencies did play a
marginal role. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board
played a dominant role at the agency level-a somewhat unusual
situation in American banking regulation with its multiplicity of
agencies-but the process -was heavily influenced by the inevitability
of judicial challenge to the Board's decisions and by frequent
appeals to Congress to resolve the situation. In Japan, the process,
although influenced by private action, was tightly controlled by the
MOF, whereas in the United States, the appearance, at least, was
that private firms were responsible for driving the process forward.
The decision process in Japan was generally private, informal, non-
litigious, and not publicly confrontational. In the United States, the
process was public, formalized, litigious, and confrontational.
We proposed that these differences can be partially captured by
the observation that the commercial paper controversy was resolved
in Japan by means of a preclearance method, whereas in the United
States, the process can be described as one of postclearance dispute
resolution. We cautioned that the preclearance-postclearance
distinction should not be overdrawn, in that postclearance features
are evident in Japan and preclearance features are evident in the
United States. Nevertheless, we believe the distinction between
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preclearance and postclearance does capture something important
about the differences between the two countries in their treatment
of the commercial paper dispute. We speculated that the Japanese
and American preferences might reflect cultural attitudes-the
relatively homogenous and geographically centralized nature of
Japanese culture, and the pluralistic, relatively geographically
dispersed nature of American culture. At the same time, the
choices made by decision-makers in the two nations might be
rational responses to an existing institutional context. Neither
method is necessarily more "efficient" at resolving disputes than the
other; rather, each method may be better adapted to different
underlying features in the society.
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